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In this paper we analyze price-setting behavior from a new angle, using the rm as the unit of
analysis. We use the micro-data underlying the U.S. Producer Price Index (PPI) and establish
three new empirical facts. We nd that the number of goods produced by rms, synchronization of
price changes within rms, and the interaction of these two are key variables for explaining price
adjustment decisions. On the theoretical side, we show that a state-dependent pricing model of
multi-product rms with rm-specic menu costs and trend in
ation can explain our empirical
ndings.
Our results have important implications for real eects of nominal shocks. First, our empirical
ndings are most directly related to the results of Midrigan (2010): allowing in a state-dependent
DSGE model for the features which we document empirically amplies real eects of monetary
shocks.1 Second, our results highlight that heterogeneity among rms, captured by the number
of goods produced by them, plays a critical role in explaining pricing dynamics. Recent work
by Carvalho (2006) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) has shown that heterogeneity in price
dynamics magnies non-neutrality of nominal shocks.
Our analysis of how the number of goods in a rm relates to pricing decisions is moreover of
independent interest: since approximately 98:55% of all prices in the PPI are set by rms with
more than one good,2 our approach contrasts with the standard macro-economic assumption of
price-setting by single-product rms. In fact, our ndings directly suggest that it is necessary to
model multi-product rms as distinct from an aggregate of many single-product rms.
We analyze the PPI micro data by grouping rms according to the number of goods produced
by them and establish the following. First, pricing behavior is systematically related to the number
of goods produced by rms. We nd that as the number of goods increases, the frequency of
price adjustment increases. At the same time, the average magnitude of price changes, conditional
1In particular, when there are complementarities in the cost of adjusting the prices of goods, price changes will
always be dispersed with some very large and some very small price changes. Therefore, monetary shocks will have
large real eects similar to models of time-dependent adjustment. Our empirical results, based on the entire PPI,
validate the key modeling assumptions needed to produce these aggregate real eects.
2We dene a good as a particular brand of product which is moreover identied according to certain characteristics
that do not change over time, such as having the same buyer over time. The data section contains further details on
the good denition.
2on adjustment, decreases. This result holds for both upwards and downwards price changes. In
addition, small price changes are highly prevalent in the data and become more prevalent when the
number of goods increases. Finally, there is substantial dispersion in the size of price changes and
it increases with the number of goods. For example, the coecient of variation of absolute price
changes and the kurtosis of price changes increase as the number of goods per rm increases.
Second, we nd strong evidence for substantial synchronization of individual price adjustment
decisions within the rm. We estimate a multinomial logit model to relate individual adjustment
decisions to the fraction of price changes of the same sign within a rm and other economic fun-
damentals. We nd that when the price of one good in a rm changes, there is a large increase in
probability that the price of another good in the rm changes in the same direction. While this re-
sult holds for both upwards and downwards adjustment decisions, the within-rm synchronization
is stronger for positive than for negative price adjustment. Moreover, our results show that such
synchronization within the rm is much stronger than within the industry.
Third, we document that the number of goods and the degree of within-rm synchronization
strongly interact in determining individual price adjustment decisions. We nd that the strength of
within-rm synchronization increases monotonically as we move to rms that produce more goods.
Again, this result holds both for upwards and downwards adjustment decisions. At the same time,
we nd that the strength of synchronization within the same industry decreases monotonically as
the number of goods increases.
Next, on the theoretical side, we develop a state-dependent pricing model of multi-product
rms that is consistent with these empirical ndings. As our major contribution, we show how the
trends in the data are critical in validating dierent features of the model. Firms in our model
face idiosyncratic productivity shocks and an aggregate in
ation shock. Moreover, there is a menu
cost of changing prices which is rm-specic and there are economies of scope in the menu cost
technology.3
The predictions of the model become clear when one compares the case of a 1-good and a 2-good
rm. When a 2-good rm decides to change a particular price, it essentially gets to change the
3We understand this menu cost very broadly as a cost of price adjustment as Blinder et al. (1998) or Zbaracki
et al. (2004) argue.
3price of a second good for free. This leads, on average, to a higher frequency of price changes and a
lower mean absolute, positive, and negative size of price changes. This also implies that the fraction
of small price changes is higher for the 2-good rm. Moreover, with trend in
ation, rms adjust
downwards only when they receive substantial negative productivity shocks. Since the rm adjusts
both prices when the desired price of one item is very far from its current price, a higher fraction
of downward price changes becomes sustainable. Moreover, both positive and negative adjustment
decisions become more synchronized within the rm. In particular, as we nd in the data, due
to shocks from upward trend in
ation positive adjustment decisions are more synchronized than
negative adjustment decisions.
Our empirical work is directly related to the recent literature that has analyzed micro-data
underlying aggregate price indices.4 Using U.S. PPI micro-data, our paper contributes the rst
account of price-setting dynamics from the perspective of the rm. Two other recent papers have
also used the same data to uncover interesting patterns. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) show
that there is substantial heterogeneity across sectors in the PPI in the frequency of price changes.
They also match groups between the CPI and the PPI database and nd that the correlation
in the frequency of price changes between the groups is quite high. Goldberg and Hellerstein
(2009) document that price rigidity in nished producer goods is roughly the same as consumer
prices including sales and that large rms change prices more frequently and by smaller amounts
compared to small rms. Our results are complementary to theirs. Neither of these papers however,
contain a systematic analysis from the perspective of the rm, and in particular, how price-setting
dynamics dier by the number of goods produced by them.
Our empirical results also speak to ndings from papers that use retail or grocery store data
to analyze pricing behavior by multi-product rms. In important contributions, Lach and Tsiddon
(1996) use retail store data and Fisher and Konieczny (2000) use data from a newspaper chain to
show that price changes are synchronized within a rm while staggered across rms. Moreover,
Lach and Tsiddon (2007) show how small price changes are prevalent in retail store data and argue
that this feature can be consistent with a model of multi-product rms where part of the cost of
4For a survey of this literature, see Klenow and Malin (2010). Most of this literature has focused on the U.S. or
the Euro Area. For an analysis of emerging markets, see Gagnon (2009).
4price adjustment is rm-specic. Midrigan (2010) uses grocery store data to show that a large
fraction of price changes are small in absolute values, and that the distribution of price changes,
conditional on adjustment, is leptokurtic. Our ndings are signicantly wider and more general
compared to these studies since we use micro-data underlying the PPI with approximately 28000
rms, focusing on price-setting at the production, not the distribution side. Importantly, given the
variation in the number of goods produced by rms in our dataset, we are able to systematically
uncover patterns across rms as we vary this dimension. This analysis is new to the literature.
Our model is related to theoretical work by Sheshinski and Weiss (1992), Midrigan (2010), and
Alvarez and Lippi (2010). In a seminal paper, Sheshinski and Weiss (1992) show the conditions
under which price-setting by multi-product rms is likely to be synchronized or staggered. They
emphasize the key role played by complementarities in the menu cost technology and in the prot
function. Midrigan (2010) presents a general equilibrium model where two-product rms face
economies of scope in the technology of adjusting prices. The striking quantitative result of his paper
is that aggregate 
uctuations from monetary shocks are substantially larger than in traditional
state-dependent models and almost as large as time-dependent models. Our main contribution
relative to the work of Sheshinski and Weiss (1992) and Midrigan (2010) is to consider and analyze
systematically price-setting trends as we vary the number of goods produced by rms, from 1 to 3
goods. As a by-product of this analysis, we are able to study trends in some price setting statistics,
such as synchronization, by considering 2-good vs. 3-good rms which is not possible by only
comparing 1-good and 2-good rms.
In a recent, independent, highly related paper, Alvarez and Lippi (2010) use stochastic control
methods to characterize the price setting solution of a multi-product rm producing an arbitrary
number of goods. They analytically show that given rm-specic menu costs, frequency of price
change increases, absolute size decreases, and the dispersion increases as the number of goods pro-
duced increases. We show these same trends numerically. Our relative contribution is that we solve
a model with trend in
ation and also generate additional predictions for direction and synchroniza-
tion of price changes. We then match all the empirical trends in these moments qualitatively using
a calibrated model. This contribution distinguishes us from the aforementioned theoretical papers.
52 Empirics
2.1 Data
We use monthly producer price micro-data from the dataset that is normally used to compute the
Producer Price Index (PPI) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Using producer prices makes
our results comparable to other studies of price-setting behavior as well as consistent with a model
where rms, and not retailers, set prices.5
The PPI contains a large number of monthly price quotes for individual \items", that is, partic-
ular brands of products with certain time-persistent characteristics. These items which we hence-
forth refer to as goods are selected to represent the entire set of goods produced in the US and
are sampled according to a multi-stage design.6 This sampling procedure takes three main steps:
in a rst step, the BLS compiles a sampling universe of all rms producing in the US using lists
from the Unemployment Insurance System. Most rms are required to participate in this system
and the BLS veries and completes the sampling frame using additional publicly available lists, for
example in the service sector. In a second step, \price-forming units" which are usually dened to
be \production entities in a single location" are selected for the sample according to the total value
of shipment of these units or according to their total employment. In a nal series of steps called
\disaggregation," a BLS agent conducts a eld visit and selects the actual goods to be selected into
the sample. Again, total values of shipment are used for selection.
In this last step, the BLS takes great care to obtain actual transaction prices. This emphasis
on transaction prices goes back to a critique by Stigler and Kindahl (1970) when the data was
based on list and not transaction prices. In addition, the BLS also uniquely identies a good
according to its \price-determining" characteristics such as the type of buyer, the type of market
transaction, the method of shipment, the size and units of shipment, the freight type, and the
day of the month of the transaction. Moreover, the BLS collects information on price discounts
5A similar analysis using CPI data is not feasible since the CPI sampling procedure does not map to the production
structure of the economy, but to sales in outlets, which may sell goods from any number of rms, including imports.
Moreover, it is generally also not even possible to identify the producing rms for specic CPI items. The CPI
specications data only sometimes records the item manufacturers.
6For a detailed description of the sampling procedures, see Chapter 14 of the BLS Handbook of Methods (US
Department of Labor, 2008).
6and special surcharges. Once a good has been sampled and uniquely identied according to its
price-determining characteristics, the BLS collects monthly prices for that very same good and the
same customer through a re-pricing form. Moreover, neither order prices nor futures prices are
included in the dataset.7
Despite this emphasis on transaction prices, there might be some concern about the quality of
the price data: respondents have the option to report on the re-pricing form that a price has not
changed. This might induce a bias in the price data towards higher price stickiness if respondents
are lazy. Using the episode of the 2001 anthrax scare when the BLS exclusively collected prices
by phone, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)8 show however, that the frequency of price changes,
controlling for in
ation and seasonality, was the same in months when data were collected using
the standard mail form as when the collection was done through personal phone calls.9
We supplement the BLS PPI data with the monthly in
ation rate from the OECD \Main
Economic Indicators (MEI)" when running our discrete choice analysis. We use both CPI in
ation
including food and energy prices as well as excluding food and energy prices. Since we nd no
qualitative dierence in our results, we only report results from the inclusive CPI measure in the
main part of the paper.
2.2 Identifying and Grouping Firms
The PPI data allow us to identify rms according to the number of goods produced by them. This
distinction uses the rm identiers and then counts the number of goods in the data for each rm
and at any point in time. We dene rms at the establishment level (for example, \Company
XYZ").10 We then group the rms into the following four good bins according to the average
7The PPI price then is dened as \the net revenue accruing to a specied producing establishment from a specied
kind of buyer for a specied product shipped, or service provided, under specied transaction terms on a specied
day of the month" (BLS, 2008).
8See footnote 12 in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). This idea was rst used in Gopinath and Rigobon (2008)
where it is applied to export and import prices.
9Moreover, since the same product is priced every month, the BLS accounts for instances of product change and
quality adjustments. When there is a physical change in a product, one of several quality adjustment methods are
used. These include the direct adjustment method for minor physical specication changes, and either the explicit
quality adjustment method or the overlap method for major changes. Hedonic regressions have also now been
introduced by the BLS into these adjustment processes.
10Therefore, we will use the terms \rms" and \establishments" interchangeably in this paper. In the PPI dataset,
they correspond to, as we have described above, what are called \price forming units."
7number of goods produced by them: a) bin 1: rms with 1 to 3 goods, b) bin 2: rms with more
than 3 to 5 goods, c) bin 3: rms with more than 5 to 7 goods, and d) bin 4: rms with more than
7 goods.11 Thus, rms in higher bins sell a greater number of goods than rms in lower bins.
It is important to emphasize that the sampled data monotonically map the number of actual
goods per rm.12 On the one hand, this is due to the BLS sampling procedure. The BLS sampling
design in the \disaggregation" stage is such that all the economically important products tend to be
sampled with probability proportional to their sales.13 In addition, the BLS pays special attention
to cover all distinct product categories if they exist in a rm and allows some discretion in sampling
when there are many products in a rm. Thus, if a rm has more products, more products will be
sampled on average. On the other hand, our strategy of binning goods into the ranges given above
leaves some room for potential errors of sampling into the \wrong" bin and allows us to average out
such errors when we calculate our statistics of interest. Finally, as the results show, our choice of
binning leads to results that our theoretical model in all cases predicts would be indeed identied
with an increasing number of goods per rm.
We present in Table 1 some descriptive statistics on rms according to the groups that we
construct. The mean (median) number of goods per rm across these bins is 2:2 (2:0), 4:0 (4:0),
6:1 (6:0), and 10:3 (8:0) respectively. The dispersion is higher in bin 4, with for example, a standard
error of 0:11. The table also shows that while the majority of rms, around 80%, fall in bins 1 and
2, there are a substantial number of rms in bins 3 and 4 as well. In fact, since rms in bins 3 and
4 produce more goods, they account for a much larger share of prices than of rms. Firms in bins
3 and 4 set around 40% of all prices in our data.
Regarding rm size, the table reports two statistics which we compute as follows. First, after
placing rms in dierent bins, we compute mean employment at the rm level, which is dened
as employment per average number of goods per rm. Then, we take the median across dierent
11Note that we have many rms who have non-integer average numbers of goods due to the averaging of the
monthly number of goods for each rm. This is one reason to have bins.
12We thank Alan Blinder and Chris Sims for pointing us to this important sampling concern.
13We know from Bernard et al. (2010) and Goldberg et al. (2008)'s Table 4 that large rms are multi-product
rms with substantial value of sales concentrated in a few goods. We present an analogous table for our dataset
in Appendix 3. Results suggest that sampling is likely to monotonically capture the actual number of economically
important goods. Please see the appendix for details.
8industries dened at the 3-digit NAICS level. Finally, we report in Table 1 as mean employment,
the average of these medians across all industries in a bin, and as median employment, the median
of these medians. The table shows that there is no clear trend in terms of median employment per
good across these dierent bins.
Table 9 in Appendix 1 presents the distribution of rms across bins and industries at the 2-digit
NAICS level. Table 9 shows that no particular industry substantially dominates a particular good
bin and that in fact, NAICS sectors 31, 32, and 33 (durable and non-durable manufacturing) are the
dominant industries for all bins, accounting for around 45-70% of all rms. Table 9 also shows that
for a particular industry, typically good bins 1 and 2 contain the vast majority of rms. Notable
exceptions are NAICS 22 (utilities) which contains a very high proportion of rms that fall in bin
4, and NAICS 62 (health care and social assistance) where almost half the rms are in bins 3 and
4. This broadly 
at composition across industries also holds at more disaggregated levels, as we
show in Appendix 1 in Tables 10 and 11.
2.3 Results
We report the results from our empirical analysis in two parts below. First, we document important
aggregate statistics on price changes, such as frequency, size, direction, and dispersion of price
changes, according to the good bins that we construct. Second, we show the role played by economic
fundamentals in pricing decisions at the good level using a discrete choice framework.14
2.3.1 Basic Statistics
Frequency of price changes We compute the frequency as the mean fraction of price changes
during the life of a good. We do not count the rst observation as a price change and assume that
14In relation to recent studies of price adjustment using micro data from the BLS and retail stores, it is worth
noting at the outset the following aspects of the PPI data. As documented by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), while
sale prices are important in the CPI data, they are not prevalent in the PPI data. Therefore, we do not distinguish
between sale and non-sale prices, for example, by using a sales lter. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) also show that
for aggregate statistics on price changes, accounting for product substitutions can make a dierence, especially in the
CPI. All the baseline results we report below are excluding product substitutions. We identify product replacement
by changes in the so-called \base price" which contains the price at each resampling of a good in the PPI. When
this base price changes within a price time series, but the data show no change in the actual price series, we set our
product substitution dummy to one. The results nevertheless remain the same while including product substitutions.
9a price has not changed if a value is missing. Also, we do not explicitly take into account issues of
left-censoring of price-spells. However, we verify that taking into account left-censoring leaves the
resulting distribution of frequencies in the PPI essentially unchanged. For our purpose, it is most
relevant that we apply our method consistently across all rms. After computing the frequency of
price changes at the good level, we calculate the median frequency for all goods within the rm.
Then, we report the mean, median, and standard error of frequencies across rms in a given good
bin. We use the standard error to compute 95% condence intervals through out the paper.
Figures 1 and 2 show that the monthly mean and median frequency of price changes increase
with the number of goods produced by rms. The mean frequency increases from 20% in bin
1 to 29% in bin 4 while the median frequency increases from 15% to 23%. The relationship is
monotonic across bins except for the mean frequency of price changes for bins 1 and 2. Inverting
these frequency values, this implies that the mean duration of a price spell decreases from 5 months
in bin 1 to 3:4 months in bin 4 while the median duration decreases from 6:7 months to 4:3 months.
Therefore, in general, rms that produce a greater number of goods change prices more frequently.15
Direction and size of price changes We dene the fraction of positive price changes as the
number of strictly positive price changes over all zero and non-zero price changes. We compute
this at the rm level and then report the mean across rms in a given good bin.16 Figure 3 shows
that the mean fraction of positive price changes decreases with the number of goods produced by
rms as it goes down from 0:64 in bin 1 to 0:61 in bin 4. Firms with many goods therefore adjust
prices upwards less frequently.
We next compute the size of price changes as the percentage change to last observed price.
Again, we compute this at the good level, take the median across goods in a rm, and then report
the mean across rms in a good bin. Figure 4 shows that the mean absolute size of price changes
decreases with the number of goods produced by rms as it goes down from 8:5% in bin 1 to 6:6%
15Using our dataset to compute an aggregate measure of frequency and duration of price changes in the PPI, we
get estimates of 0.21 and 0.16 for the mean and median frequency and 6.91 and 5.74 months for the mean and median
duration. This is calculated by rst computing the frequency at the good level, second by taking the median across
goods in a classication group, third, by taking the median across classication groups within six-digit categories and
fourth, by taking means and medians across six-digit categories.
16While we report only the mean across rms in a given bin for all statistics other than frequency, all our results
are completely robust to whether we compute the mean or the median across rms.
10in bin 4.17
Moreover, this relationship holds even when we separate out the price changes into positive and
negative price changes. Figure 5 shows that the mean size of positive price changes decreases with
the number of goods while the mean size of negative price changes increases with the number of
goods. Thus, in general, rms that produce a greater number of goods adjust their prices by a
smaller amount, both upwards and downwards.
An interesting statistic in this context is the fraction of small price changes where we dene a
small price change as: jpi;tj  jpi;tj; where i is a rm and  = 0:5. That is, a price change is
small if it is less in absolute terms than a specied fraction (here 0:5) of the mean absolute price
change in a rm. After computing this at the rm level, we then report the mean in a good bin.
Figure 6 shows that the mean fraction of small price changes increases from 0:38 in bin 1 to 0:55
in bin 4. Therefore, small price changes are more prevalent when rms produce many goods and
in fact, for bin 4, more than half the price changes are small.
Dispersion of price changes We use three measures to document the dispersion of price
changes: the the coecient of variation of absolute price changes, the kurtosis of price changes, and
the 1st and the 99th percentiles. We report the coecient of variation of absolute price changes that
we compute as follows: we pool data at the rm level, compute the ratio of the standard deviation
to the mean of absolute price changes for an item, take the mean across items in a rm, and then
take means across rms in a good bin. Table 2 shows that it increases from 1:02 in bin 1 to 1:55 in
bin 4:











(pi;t   p)4 (1)
17Using our dataset to compute an aggregate measure of the absolute size of price changes in the PPI, we nd
estimates of 6.96% and 5.34% for the mean and median size. This is calculated by rst computing the mean absolute
price change at the good level, second by taking the median across goods in a classication group, third, by taking
the median across classication groups within six-digit categories and fourth, by taking means and medians across
six-digit categories.
11and where in a given rm with n goods, pi;t denotes the price change of good i, p the mean
price change and 4 is the square of the usual variance estimate. Figure 7 shows that the mean
kurtosis of price changes increases with the number of goods produced by rms as it goes up from
5:3 in bin 1 to 16:8 in bin 4. Thus, even for bin 1, the distribution is leptokurtic.
We also document in Figure 8 that both the 1st and the 99th percentiles of price change take more
extreme values as the number of goods increases. Thus, overall, our results show that dispersion
in price changes increases with the number of goods produced by rms.
Robustness We conduct a battery of robustness tests for our aggregate results. All the results
in this section can be found in Appendix 1. For conciseness, we only present results on frequency
and size of price changes.
We show that our results are robust to controlling for various factors, independent of the number
of goods, that might potentially lead to the trends across bins that we document. Figures 15 and
16 show that the trends hold while controlling linearly for the size of the rm, using the total
number of employees in the rm as a measure of rm size, while Figures 17 and 18 document the
same trends while controlling at 2-, 3-, and 4-digit NAICS sectoral levels. As we document above,
a majority of the rms are in 2-digit sectors 31; 32; and 33; and so it is natural to wonder if our
results are valid only for these sectors. We show in Figures 19 - 22 that this is not the case. The
trends in frequency and size remain whether we take out sectors 31; 32; and 33; or if we compute
these statistics separately for these sectors.
While we show that our results do not change when we add controls for sectors, one might still
worry that the trends across bins are due to varying elasticities of demand or degrees of substitution.
To verify that this is not the case, we conduct the following detailed test. First, we pick rms that
sell goods in a narrow product code provided by the BLS at the 6-digit level.18 Second, we compute
the median frequency of price changes, the absolute size of price changes, and the number of goods
sold by the rms at a point in time. Third, we run two regressions: rst, the frequency of price
changes on the number of goods and second, the absolute size of price changes on the number
18The relevant product code is the PPI product code. We exclude rms which sell in multiple product codes to
simplify the analysis and avoid having to \split up" rms.
12of goods. We take the median of the estimated coecients across all product codes, and then
report summary statistics on these medians over time. Tables 12 and 13 present the results and
show clearly that the estimates go in the right direction. Thus, the positive relationship between
frequency of price changes and number of goods, and the negative relationship between size of price
changes and number of goods continues to hold, even when we tightly control for varying elasticities
of demand or substitution.
We also verify that our results on small price changes are robust to various alternate denitions.
Recall that in our baseline results, we dened small price change as jpi;tj  jpi;tj where i is
a rm and  = 0:5: In Table 14 we show that our results continue to hold for  = 0:10; 0:25;
and 0:33. Table 14 also shows that the results are robust if we dene small price changes in terms
of absolute values. That is, price changes that are less than 0:25%; or 0:5%; or 1%: In Table 15
we show that the trends across bins also persist if we measure small price changes relative to the
mean in the industry. That is, a small price change is now dened as jpi;j;tj  jpj;tj where i
is a rm, j is the industry dened at the 4-, 6-, and 8-digit NAICS levels, and  = 0:5: Finally,
the results also do not change if we dene small price changes at the level of the good and relative
to the mean price change of that good, and only then aggregate up to the level of the rm. Table
16 shows the results for  = 0:5. Again, results show that there is a substantial fraction of small
price changes. This fraction increases monotonically with the number of goods. Thus, our nding
of substantial fraction of small price changes is not a mechanical result due to computation of this
fraction at the rm-level.19
While we have conducted exhaustive checks to conrm that it is the number of goods produced
by rms that is responsible for the variation across the good bins, one might still wonder if the
trends are due to other sources of permanent heterogeneity across rms or sectors. To control
for such spurious eects, we have ltered out month-, product-, and rm-level xed eects, with
product-level xed eects dened at the 4-, 6- and 8-digit PPI product codes. We show in Table
19Additionally, there is a third way to compute a fraction of small price changes for a rm by computing the
fraction of small price changes for a good but relative to the mean absolute size of price changes at the rm level and
then aggregating across goods. We have also computed the fraction of small price changes this way and obtain very
similar results.
1317 that the variation in price changes explained by these xed eects is at most 29%.20
Finally, since we have panel data, another potential check on our results would be to consider
time-series variation in the number of goods for a given rm and compute the various statistics.
Unfortunately, in our dataset, there is very little variation in the number of goods over time for a
given rm, and hence we do not investigate this further.21
2.3.2 Regression Analysis
Here, we go beyond providing aggregate statistics and estimate a discrete choice model to analyze
what economic fundamentals determine pricing dynamics at the good level. In particular, we
estimate a multinomial logit model for the decision to change prices. This allows us to separately
examine the relationship of upwards and downwards adjustment decisions with the explanators.22
We impose a multinomial logit link function with 3 categories: m = 0 for no price change,
m = 1 for a price increase, and m =  1 for a price decrease. The multinomial logit model is
described in detail for example, by Agresti (2007). Denoting by i;m the probability that decision




m eXi;tm : (3)
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P
m m;t = 1, the three sets of parameters are not unique. Therefore, we follow standard









i;f;p;t + i;f;p;t (2)
where i denotes an item, f a rm, p a product at the 4-, 6-, and 8-digit level, and t time. Dummies are for months,
products, and rms. This is a standard decomposition similar to the one performed in Midrigan (2010).
21The median change in the number of goods during our 1998 to 2005 sampling period is 0. Even when there is
change in the number of goods, it is small so that rms generally do not fall into a dierent bin. The median increase
in the number of goods, given an increase in the number of goods, is 1 good and the median decrease is 1 good. The
lack of time series variation is not surprising for several reasons. First, resampling usually takes place only every
5 years so that the number of goods remains constant in the meantime. Second, the relative importance of rms
according to the BLS does not change as drastically such as as to lead to a dierent number of goods being sampled
for a given rm when the survey sampling design xes how many goods to sample in total due to a budget constraint.
22Instead of the multinomial logit model, we could also estimate an ordered probit model, as in Midrigan (2010)
and Neiman (2010). This would assume that there is a \ranking" of outcomes in terms of how the latent underlying
variable cutos relate to the right-hand side variables. The latent variable in our case could be interpreted as deviation
from the desired optimal price. This might indeed result in some ordering { for example, high in
ation means one
is likely below the desired optimal price and hence, 1 is the adjustment decision preferred to 0 and -1. For other
right-hand side variables, however, this relationship is unclear, for example for the fraction of price changes within
the rm or even month dummies. Hence, we estimate conservatively using the multinomial logit model.





m2( 1;1) eXi;tm : (4)
We estimate the two remaining logit equations simultaneously. The logit model has the convenient
property that the estimated coecients take on the natural interpretation of the eect of the
explanators on the probability of adjusting prices up or down over taking no action.
We include as controls in X the fraction of price changes at the same rm and the same six-digit
NAICS sector, excluding the price change of the good we are trying to explain. These variables
are meant to capture the extent of synchronization in price setting at the rm and the sectoral
level. Moreover, to control for a measure of marginal costs, we also include in X the average price
change of goods in the same rm and six-digit NAICS sector. We also include a dummy for product
replacement where we can identify it: so-called \base prices" in the PPI contain the rst price at
each resampling. When this base price changes within a price time series but the data show no
change in the actual price series, we set the product replacement dummy to one. As an important
fundamental factor, we include energy and food inclusive CPIs in X: Finally, we control for the
total number of employees in the rm, industry xed eects, month xed eects, and time trends
in the data.
We are not aware of any other similar broad-based analysis of U.S. producer micro prices. Since
the results for the PPI as a whole are likely to be of independent interest, we rst estimate the
model on pooled data across all good bins. Then, we focus on estimation separately by good bins.
Pooled Data Table 18 in Appendix 1 shows the detailed results from this multinomial logit
model for the pooled data across all good bins. There, we report what are called the relative risk
ratios, equivalently the odds ratios, for the dierent independent variables. Therefore, a coecient
value greater than 1 indicates that a change in the independent variable increases the odds of the
dependent category compared with the base category. In the following, we focus on the marginal
eect at the mean and the eect when the dependent variable changes from mean  1=2 standard
deviation to mean +1=2 standard deviation. Our main ndings are as follows:
15Synchronization of price changes We nd robust evidence for synchronization of price
setting both within the industry and the rm, as documented in Table 3.23 First, we nd that
adjustment decisions are synchronized within the industry: the probability of adjusting the price
of a good in a rm is higher when the fraction of price changes of the same sign in the industry,
excluding that good, increases. This holds for both negative and positive price changes. The eects
are both statistically and economically signicant. When evaluated at the mean, a 1 percentage
point increase in the fraction of negative price changes of other goods in the industry leads to a
0:06 percentage point increase in probability of a negative price change of a good. Similarly, a 1
percentage point increase in the fraction of positive price changes of other goods in the industry
leads to a 0:1 percentage point increase in probability of a positive price change of a good. The
economic signicance can also be discerned from the eects when at the mean the fraction of
price changes of the same sign changes by one standard deviation: for negative price changes,
the probability of a downward price change of a good increases by 1:32 percentage points, while
for positive price changes, the probability of an upward price change of a good increases by 2:27
percentage points.
Second, the results also show that there is substantial synchronization of adjustment decisions
within the rm. When the fraction of price changes of the same sign of other goods within the rm
increases, then the likelihood of a price change of a given good increases. Again, this holds for both
negative and positive price changes. When evaluated at the mean, a 1 percentage point increase
in the fraction of negative price changes of other goods in the rm leads to a 0:32 percentage
point increase in probability of a negative price change of a good. Similarly, a 1 percentage point
increase in the fraction of positive price changes of other goods in the rm leads to a 0:53 percentage
point increase in probability of a positive price change of a good. These eects are therefore not
only statistically, but also highly economically, signicant. The economic signicance can also be
discerned from the eects when at the mean, the fraction of price changes of the same sign changes
by one standard deviation: for negative price changes, the probability of a downward price change
of a good increases by 8:81 percentage points, while for positive price changes, the probability
23To avoid cluttering, we do not report the p-values, but all the results we report are statistically signicant.
16of an upward price change of a good increases by 14:7 percentage points. Finally, the coecient
on the fraction of same-signed price changes is larger for positive adjustment decisions than for
negative adjustment decisions. In fact, the marginal eect is about twice as large for positive price
adjustment decisions.
State-dependent response to in
ation The results in table 3 also show evidence for the
fundamental role played by in
ation, an important aggregate shock, in pricing decisions. In par-
ticular, the likelihood of a price decrease decreases with higher CPI in
ation while the likelihood
of a price increase increases. This is as one would expect from a model where rms adjust prices
in a state-dependent fashion. The eects are both statistically and economically signicant. When
evaluated at the mean, a 1 percentage point increase in CPI in
ation decreases the probability of
a negative price change of a good by 0:61 percentage points, while increasing the probability of a
positive price change by 0:48 percentage points. Similarly, when at the mean, CPI in
ation changes
by one standard deviation, the probability of a negative price change of a good decreases by 0:21
percentage points, while the probability of a positive price change increases by 0:17 percentage
points.
Critical role of within-rm variables The inclusion of within-rm variables, which is
unique to our analysis, plays a critical role in explaining price setting behavior. Notice from above
that the within-rm eects are much stronger than the within industry eects. To isolate the key
role of the within-rm variables more clearly, we run the same regressions as above but exclude
from X the fraction of price changes in the same rm and the average price change of goods in the
same rm. Tables 4 shows that while the evidence on synchronization of price changes within the
industry and the fundamental role of in
ation remain intact, the explanatory power of the model
drops signicantly. The R2 goes down from 48% to 30%.24
By Bins Next, we run the multinominal logit regression for the four good bins separately to
investigate dierences due to the number of goods produced by rms. Tables 5 and 6 show the
24The R
2 measure we report denotes the usual pseudo-R
2. This statistic is based on the likelihood and measures
improvements of the model t.
17results for the marginal eect at the mean and the eect when the dependent variable changes from
mean   1=2 standard deviation to mean + 1=2 standard deviation. Our main results, as we move
from bin 1 to bin 4, are as follows:
Decreasing within-industry synchronization It is clear that the coecient on the fraction
of price changes in the industry decreases as the number of goods produced by rms increases. When
evaluated at the mean, the eect of a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction of negative price
changes of other goods in the industry on the probability of a negative price change of the good
goes down from 0:11 percentage points in bin 1 to  0:06 percentage points in bin 4. Similarly, the
eect of a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction of positive price changes of other goods in the
industry on the probability of a positive price change of the good goes down from 0:16 percentage
points in bin 1 to 0 percentage points in bin 4. Finally, the eect when at the mean, the fraction of
price changes of the same sign changes by one standard deviation goes down from 2:10 percentage
points to  1:51 percentage points for negative price changes and from 3:07 percentage points to
0:21 percentage points for positive price changes.
Increasing within-rm synchronization The tables also show that the coecients on the
fraction of price changes on goods within the same rm increases as the number of goods produced
by rms increases. When evaluated at the mean, the eect of a 1 percentage point increase in the
fraction of negative price changes of other goods in the rm on the probability of a negative price
change of the good goes up substantially from 0:25 percentage points in bin 1 to 0:51 percentage
points in bin 4. Similarly, the eect of a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction of positive price
changes of other goods in the rm on the probability of a positive price change of the good goes up
from 0:44 percentage points in bin 1 to 0:78 percentage points in bin 4. Finally, the eect when at the
mean, the fraction of price changes of the same sign changes by one standard deviation, increases
from 5:38 percentage points to 15:8 percentage points for negative price changes and from 9:61
percentage points to 24:24 percentage points for positive price changes. Importantly, the marginal
eects of a change in the fraction of price adjustment within the rm on individual adjustment
decisions is systematically larger across all bins for positive adjustment decisions compared to
18negative adjustment decisions. Thus, we nd that there is evidence for greater synchronization of
price changes within the rm as the number of goods produced by the rm increases. Moreover,
synchronization is always stronger for positive than for negative price changes.
Robustness We conduct a battery of robustness tests for our good-level regressions. First, we
consider dierent levels of aggregation for our denition of the industry variable. In conducting
this extension, in addition to checking for robustness, we are motivated by the theoretical results
in Bhaskar (2002) that synchronization is likely to be higher within groups with higher elasticity of
substitution among goods, that is, at a more disaggregated industry level. Table 20 in Appendix
1 presents results using an industry classication at the 2-digit NAICS level. It shows that at this
higher level of aggregation, prices in the pooled data specication are much less synchronized at the
industry level, compared with Table 3. Table 20 also shows results for the four good bins separately.
The general result of higher rm level synchronization and lower industry level synchronization as
we move to higher good bins is robust to this alternate denition of industry.25 Compared to Table
6 and as predicted by Bhaskar (2002), however, we see the signicant extent to which the industry
level synchronization has decreased across all bins.
Second, we check that clustering standard errors at the industry level do not aect out ndings.
Third, we use a polynomial function for the size of rms to control for non-linear size eects in the
regressions. Our results do not change due to this modication. Fourth, we use a CPI measure
that excludes food and energy prices. Finally, we estimate the multinomial logit model only for the
adjustment decisions for the largest sales-value item of each rm. Again, our results do not change
due to this modication, in particular with respect to synchronization.26
25This result is similar to that of Cornille and Dossche (2008) and Dhyne and Konieczny (2007) who use the Belgian
PPI and the CPI respectively. They use the Fisher-Konieczny measure of synchronization and nd that prices tend
to be more synchronized at a more disaggregated industry level. Neither of these papers look at the level of the rm,
however, which is the focus of our paper, and also the factor that matters most quantitatively in our data.
26The results mentioned in the second robustness paragraph are available upon request from the authors.
193 Theory
Compared to the literature, our main challenge here is to theoretically explain the various trends
we observe in price setting as we vary the number of goods produced by rms, an analysis that has
not been undertaken before. We turn to this task next. Since the mapping from the good bins that
we construct in the empirical section to the number of goods in the model is not clear and direct,
we view our exercise in this section as qualitative in nature. At the same time, however, the results
from model simulations will play a key role in validating features that are needed to explain the
empirical trends.
3.1 Model
We use a partial equilibrium setting of a rm that decides each period whether to update the prices
of its n goods indexed by i 2 (1;2;3), and what prices to charge if it updates. Our model is similar
to the ones in Sheshinski and Weiss (1992), Midrigan (2010), and Alvarez and Lippi (2010). The
main dierence is that compared to Sheshinski and Weiss (1992) and Alvarez and Lippi (2010) we
allow for a stochastic aggregate shock, while compared to Midrigan (2010), we solve for equilibrium
as we vary n. In particular, the latter variation allows us to make two contributions. First, we can
solve for trends in price-setting behavior with respect to how many goods rms produce. Second,
we can compute trends in synchronization of price-setting by comparing 2-good and 3-good rms.
Since no measures of synchronization can be computed in the one-good case, the comparison of
2-good and 3-good rms is necessary to model trends in synchronization of adjustment decisions.
In our model, the rm produces output of good i using a technology that is linear in labor:
ci;t = Ai;t li;t
where Ai;t is a good-specic productivity shock that follows an exogenous process:
lnAi;t = i
A lnAi;t 1 + i
A;t
20where E[i
A;t] = 0 and var(Ai;t) = (i
A)2. We assume that there is no correlation between good-
specic shocks. We do this in order to isolate the eect of multi-product rms on the decision
to synchronize price adjustment when the underlying idiosyncratic shocks are uncorrelated, while
controlling for the common in
ationary shock.






Ct i = 1;2;:::;n
where Ct is aggregate consumption, Pt is the aggregate price level, pi;t is the price of good i; and
 is the elasticity of substitution across goods. In this partial equilibrium setting, we normalize
Ct =  C. We also assume that the price level Pt exogenously follows a random walk with a drift:
lnPt = P + lnPt 1 + P;t
where E[P;t] = 0 and var(P;t) = (P)2: Given our assumption about technology, the real marginal
cost of the rm for good i, MCi;t, is therefore given by: MCi;t = Wt
Ai;tPt; where Wt is the nominal
wage. We normalize Wt
Pt =  w:
Whenever the rm adjusts one or more than one of its prices, it has to pay a constant, rm-
specic \menu cost", K(n) > 0.27 We understand this \menu cost" very broadly as a general
cost of price adjustment, not the literal cost of relabeling the price tags of goods. Blinder et al.
(1998) and Zbaracki et al. (2004) provide some evidence for such a broader interpretation of \menu
costs." The cost of changing prices may depend on the number of goods produced by the rm and










These assumptions mean that the cost of changing prices increases monotonically with the number
27This assumption implies that the rm will either adjust all the prices at the same time or adjust none. In our
dataset, this is a good rst-order assumption: conditional on observing at least one adjustment per rm, the total
fraction of goods adjusting in a rm is 0.75.
21of goods produced, and that there are increasing cost savings as more and more goods are subject
to price adjustment. Therefore, there are economies of scope in the cost of changing prices.28
Given this setup, the rm maximizes the expected discounted sum of prots from selling all of















The problem of the rm is to choose whether to update all prices in a given period, and if so, by
how much. Whenever it updates prices, it has to pay the menu cost K.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Computation
We solve this problem for a rm that produces n = 1, n = 2; and n = 3 goods. First, we employ
collocation methods to nd the policy functions of the rm. Second, given the policy functions, we
simulate time series of shocks and corresponding adjustment decisions for many periods. Finally,
we compute statistics of interest for each simulation and good, and across simulations. We also
estimate a multi-nomial logit model of adjustment decisions using the simulated data to compare
our theoretical results with the empirical ndings. Appendix 2 provides further details about
computation and analysis.
We present our choice of parameters in Table 7. Since our model is monthly, we choose a
discount rate  of (0:96)
1
12. We use a value of K such that menu costs are a 0:35% of steady-state
revenues for the 1-good rm, 0:65% for a 2-good rm, and 0:75% for a 3-good rm.29 We choose
 to be 4, which implies a markup of 33%. To parametrize the exogenous processes, we set the
trend in aggregate in
ation to be a monthly increase of 0:21%: We use persistent idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, where the AR(1) parameter is 0:96. We choose 0:37% and 2% respectively for
28While we do not model this adjustment process in detail, one can for example think about the adjustment
technology as a xed cost of hiring a manager to change prices: it is costly to hire him in the rst place, but much
less costly to have him adjust the price of each additional good.
29We will need to have menu cost increasing as we increase the number of goods, since otherwise we will not be
able to generate large price changes.
22the standard deviations of the aggregate in
ation and the idiosyncratic productivity shock. For
the rms with 2 and 3 goods, we use the same values for the persistence and variance of the all
idiosyncratic productivity shocks.30 All of our parameters are standard in the literature.
3.2.2 Findings
We present the main results from the simulations in Table 8 and illustrate them graphically in
Figures 9-14. As we increase the number of goods from 1 to 3, the model predicts clear and
systematic trends in the key price-setting statistics which align, qualitatively, with our empirical
ndings.
First, we nd that the frequency of price changes goes up from 15:22% to 19:72% while the mean
absolute size of price changes goes down from 5:21% to 3:96% as we increase the number of goods.
Second, the decrease in the absolute size of price changes also holds for both positive and negative
prices changes: they go down from 5:34% to 4:23% and from  5:02% to  3:57% respectively.
Third, the fraction of small price changes increases from 1:33%, barely none, to 23:59%. Thus,
while rms with more goods change prices more frequently, they does so by smaller amounts on
average. Fourth, we also see that the fraction of positive price changes decreases from 61:68% to
59:38%: Thus, as in the data, rms with more goods adjust downwards more frequently. Finally,
the model predicts that kurtosis increases from 1:38 to 1:97, again consistent with our empirical
ndings.
What is the mechanism behind our results? For simplicity, compare a 1-good rm with a 2-good
rm. For the case of a 2-good rm, when the rm decides to pay the rm-specic menu cost to
adjust one of the prices, it also changes the price of the other good because it gets to change it
basically for free. This leads, on average, to a higher frequency of price changes. At the same time,
for the 2-good rm, since a lot of price changes happen even when the desired price is not very
dierent from the current price of the good, the mean absolute size of price changes is lower. This
smaller mean also implies that the fraction of \small" price changes is much higher for the 2-good
rm. In fact, for the 1-good rm, which is the standard menu cost model, the fraction of small
30As emphasized before, in the baseline case, we assume that there is no correlation among the idiosyncratic
productivity shocks within the rm.
23price changes is negligible because in that case, the rm adjusts prices only when the desired price
is very dierent from the current price.
What causes the decrease in the fraction of positive price changes? With trend in
ation, rms
adjust downwards only when they receive very big negative productivity shocks. With rm-specic
menu costs, since the rm adjusts both prices when the desired price of one good is very far from
its current price, it is now more sustainable to have a higher fraction of downward price changes.
Finally, kurtosis increases as we go from one good to two goods because of a higher fraction of price
changes in the middle of the distribution.
Next, we address trend in synchronization of individual good-level price changes. Using simu-
lated data, we run the same multinominal logit regression as in the empirical section to investigate
if price changes become more synchronized as the number of goods produced by rms increases.
We thus estimate the following equation, with no price changes as the base category:
fpt 6= 0g 1;0;+1 = 0 + 1ft + 2t + t (6)
where ft is the fraction of same-signed adjustment decisions at time t within the rm and t is the
in
ation rate at time t.
It is important to emphasize here the need to go beyond a 2-good case and consider a 3-good case,
because we otherwise cannot check if the model predicts trends in synchronization of price changes
that are consistent with the empirical ndings. Table 8 shows that the strength of synchronization,
that is the coecient estimate in the multinominal logit regressions for the fraction of other goods
of the rm changing in the same direction, increases as we go from a 2-good rm to a 3-good rm.
Importantly, as is the case empirically, this is the case with both upwards and downwards price
changes.
In addition, Table 8 also makes clear that the simulations predict that positive price adjustment
decisions are more synchronized than negative adjustment decisions. That is, the synchronization
coecient for upwards price adjustment decisions is always higher than the coecient for downwards
adjustment decisions. This dierence in synchronization probabilities is due to positive trend
in
ation. Without positive trend in
ation, the dierence disappears. The model thus matches our
24ndings on synchronization established in the empirical section.
3.2.3 Robustness
In this section, we discuss several extensions of our baseline model. The key objective in this section
is to investigate if there are alternative ways to generate the trends that we nd in the data. In
particular, we will mainly shut down the economies of scope in menu cost channel that we have
proposed above, while computing results under other modeling assumptions. Appendix 2 contains
the tables summarizing results from these simulations.
First, we investigate the possibility that perhaps our empirical results are driven by the fact that
rms that produce more goods also produce more substitutable goods. We simulate a specication
of 2 and 3 good rms with no economies of scope in the cost of adjusting prices but with an
elasticity of substitution among goods that is higher than that compared to the 1 good rm.
As Table 21 shows, while matching the trends in frequency, size, and fraction of positive price
changes, this specication fails to match trends in the fraction of small price changes, kurtosis, and
synchronization as we increase the number of goods.
Second, we allow for correlation among the productivity shocks. In our main setup, we had not
allowed for correlation of productivity shocks at the rm-level in order to isolate the predictions of
the model arising solely due to economies of scope in menu costs. Table 22 shows that allowing for
such correlation does yield a higher synchronization of price changes within the rm, but at the
same time, fails to match trends in frequency and size of price changes.
Third, there might be concern that our synchronization results could be due to purely me-
chanical, statistical reasons. To investigate this possibility, we perform two tests. In the rst, we
run a Monte-Carlo exercise based on a simple statistical model of price changes. We model price
changes as i.i.d. Bernoulli trials with a xed probability of success. Using simulated time series for
an arbitrary number of goods, we estimate our synchronization equation. We nd no mechanical
trend in synchronization as the number of goods increases. In the second test, we use the same
parametrized model of a single-good rm from our simulation exercise and model a multi-product
rm as a collection of multiple, independent single-product rms. That is, a 2-good rm now is
25simply a collection of two single-good rms, with no economies of scope in cost of adjusting prices.
Similarly, a 3-good rm is a collection of three single-good rms, with no economies of scope in
cost of adjusting prices. When we run our synchronization test with simulated data from these
specications, we nd that the model cannot produce synchronization results that are consistent
with the empirical ndings. For example, the synchronization coecient estimated using simulated
data on negative price changes is negative, as opposed to positive in the data. Incidentally, this
specication of multiproduct rms as multiple single-good rms fails to match any of our aggregate
trends in price-setting as shown in Table 23. These results therefore highlight the need to model a
multi-product rm as distinctly dierent from an aggregate of multiple single-product rms.
Fourth, we allow for a menu of menu costs instead of the rm-specic menu cost structure that
we use. For example, in the 2-good case, the rm now has a choice of adjusting 0, 1, or 2 goods.
There are dierent menu costs for adjusting the price of 1 good and 2 goods, but some savings in
the cost when adjusting the prices of both goods. Our results are robust to this possible extension.
In fact, as shown in Table 24, this specication cannot account for the extent of synchronization in
price changes observed in the data.
Fifth, we consider two alternative demand specications. In the rst specication, we allow for
non-zero cross-elasticities of demand among the goods produced by the rm, which is precluded
in our baseline model with CES demand. As Table 25 shows, while this case generates a higher
fraction of small price changes and greater kurtosis, it cannot account for the trend in the size
of price changes. In the second specication, we allow for idiosyncratic demand shocks as an
alternative to productivity shocks. We present the results in Table 26. We nd that demand
shocks are unable to generate the fraction of negative price changes that we observe in the data.
4 Discussion
Our empirical results have a direct bearing on modeling price-setting by rms, as already re
ected
in our choice of the model in Section 3. The signicant fraction of negative price changes that
we document implies, as Golosov and Lucas Jr. (2007) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) also
argue, that models that rely on only aggregate shocks, and hence predict predominantly positive
26price changes with modest in
ation, are inconsistent with micro data. We have also shown that the
absolute size of price changes are large, which again suggests the need for idiosyncratic rm-level
shocks, as emphasized by Golosov and Lucas Jr. (2007) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008). At
the same time however, there is a substantial fraction of small price changes in the data and the
distribution of price changes is highly leptokurtic. This observation implies that simple menu cost
models are inconsistent with micro data since they do not predict enough small price changes, which
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) and Midrigan (2010) similarly point out. Using a discrete choice model
for changes of producer prices, we have documented new broad based evidence for synchronization
of producer price changes within industries and rms. This suggests a model with industry and rm
level strategic complementaries. We also show that in
ation plays a fundamental role in pricing
decisions by increasing the likelihood of a price increase while decreasing the likelihood of a price
decrease. This suggests that a model with simple time-dependent pricing rules will be unable to
match the ndings.
More importantly, the central empirical focus of this paper, an analysis according to the number
of goods produced by rms, has substantial aggregate implications related to real eects of monetary
shocks. We have documented that heterogeneity, captured by the number of goods produced by
rms, matters critically for price dynamics. We know from recent work of Carvalho (2006) and
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), which take a sectoral perspective, that heterogeneity in price
dynamics magnies non-neutrality of nominal shocks. Translating this insight to heterogeneity at
the rm level similarly implies non-neutrality of nominal shocks. Moreover, most directly related
to our empirical ndings are the aggregate implications of Midrigan (2010). He shows that if one
includes rm-specic menu costs, then a state-dependent model produces substantial real eects
of monetary shocks, almost as much as a time-dependent model. Our empirical results, based on
the entire PPI, validate that modeling assumption, in particular, by matching trends for rms with
dierent numbers of goods.
275 Conclusion
In this paper, we have established three new facts regarding multi-product price-setting in the U.S.
Producer Price Index. First, we show that as the number of goods produced by rms increases, price
changes are more frequent, the size price changes is lower, the fraction of positive price changes
decreases, and price changes become more dispersed. Second, we nd evidence for substantial
synchronization of price adjustment decisions within the rm. Third, we nd that the number
of goods and the degree of synchronization within rms strongly interact in determining price
adjustment decisions: as the number of goods increases, synchronization within rms increases.
Motivated by these ndings, we present a model with rm-specic menu costs where rms are
subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. We show that as we change the number of goods
produced by the rms, the patterns predicted by the model regarding frequency, size, direction,
dispersion, and synchronization of price changes are consistent with the empirical ndings.
While beyond the scope of this paper, an immediate question for future research will be to look
into reasons why rms produce dierent numbers of goods. We also hope to investigate in future
work the implications of our ndings for business cycle dynamics, real exchange rate behavior, and
optimal monetary policy.
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306 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics by Bin
Number of Goods
1-3 3-5 5-7 >7
Mean Employment 2996 1427 1132 1016
Median Employment 427 155 195 296
% of Prices 17.15 43.53 18.16 21.16
Mean # of Goods 2.21 4.05 6.06 10.26
Std. Error # Goods 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11
Std. Dev. # Goods 0.77 0.34 0.40 4.88
Minimum # of Goods 1 3.01 5.01 7.02
Maximum # of Goods 3 5 7 77
25% Percentile # Goods 1.78 3.94 5.91 7.98
Median # Goods 2 4 6 8
75% Percentile # Goods 3 4 6 11.77
Number of Firms 9111 13577 3532 2160
We group rms in the PPI by the number of goods. Bin 1 groups
rms with 1 to 3, bin 2 rms with 3 to 5, bin 3 rms with 5 to 7 and
bin 4 rms with more than 7 goods. We calculate mean and median
employment by taking means and medians of the number of employees
per good across rms in a category. % of Prices denotes the fraction
of prices in the PPI set by rms in each bin.
31Table 2: Coecient of Variation of Price Changes
Firm-Based Good-Based
1-3 Goods 1.02 0.96
(0.01) (0.01)
3-5 Goods 1.15 1.00
(0.01) (0.01)
5-7 Goods 1.30 1.10
(0.02) (0.02)
> 7 Goods 1.55 1.24
(0.02) (0.02)
For the rst column, we compute the coecient of
variation at the level of the rm pooling all price
changes. Then, we take medians across rms, bin
by bin. For the second column, we compute the
coecient of variation for each good, take the me-
dian across goods within the rm and then medi-
ans across rms.
Table 3: Marginal Eects, Multinomial Logit
Marginal Eects  1/2 Std. Dev.
- + - +
Fraction Industry 0.06% 0.10% 1.32% 2.27%
Fraction Firm 0.32% 0.53% 8.82% 14.73%
CPI -0.61% 0.48% -0.21% 0.17%
R2 47.56%
Based on the regression results in Table 18, the table shows two marginal eects associated
with changes in key explanatory variables for upwards (+) and downwards (-) adjustment.
The rst is the change in percentage points in the probability of adjusting upwards or
downwards given a unit change in the explanatory variable at the mean. The second (
1/2 Std. Dev.) is the change in percentage points in probability associated with a change
from half a standard deviation below to half a standard deviation above the mean of the
explanator. All eects are statistically signicantly dierent from zero.
Table 4: Marginal Eects, Multinomial Logit
Marginal Eects  1/2 Std. Dev.
- + - +
Fraction Industry 0.27% 0.47% 6.00% 10.29%
CPI -0.73% 0.47% -0.25% 0.16%
R2 29.33%
Based on the regression results in Table 19, the table shows two marginal eects associated
with changes in key explanatory variables for upwards (+) and downwards (-) adjustment.
The rst is the change in percentage points in the probability of adjusting upwards or
downwards given a unit change in the explanatory variable at the mean. The second (
1/2 Std. Dev.) is the change in percentage points in probability associated with a change
from half a standard deviation below to half a standard deviation above the mean of the
explanator. All eects are statistically signicantly dierent from zero.
32Table 5: Marginal Eects by Bin
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4
Negative Change
Fraction Industry 0.11% 0.07% 0.04% -0.06%
Fraction Firm 0.25% 0.26% 0.35% 0.51%
CPI -0.24% -0.39% -0.50% -1.55%
Positive Change
Fraction Industry 0.16% 0.10% 0.07% 0.01%
Fraction Firm 0.45% 0.45% 0.56% 0.78%
CPI 0.49% 0.28% 0.41% 1.02%
R2 42.85% 47.93% 48.33% 49.10%
The table shows the bin-specic marginal eects in percentage points
of a unit change in the explanators around the mean on the proba-
bility of adjusting prices upwards or downwards. Marginal eects are
calculated for the model estimated as for Table 18 but for each bin
separately. All reported eects are statistically signicantly dierent
from zero.
Table 6: Marginal Eects by Bin,  1/2 Std. Dev.
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4
Negative Change
Fraction Industry 2.10% 1.41% 0.89% -1.51%
Fraction Firm 5.38% 6.52% 9.92% 15.78%
CPI -0.08% -0.14% -0.17% -0.54%
Positive Change
Fraction Industry 3.07% 2.12% 1.55% 0.21%
Fraction Firm 9.61% 11.46% 15.94% 24.24%
CPI 0.17% 0.10% 0.14% 0.35%
R2 42.85% 47.93% 48.33% 49.10%
The table shows the bin-specic marginal eects in percentage points
of a one-standard deviation change in the explanators around the mean
on the probability of adjusting prices upwards or downwards. Marginal
eects are calculated for the model estimated as for Table 18 but for
each bin separately. All reported eects are statistically signicantly
dierent from zero.









The table shows our choice of pa-
rameter values used in the simula-
tion exercise.
Table 8: Results of Simulation
1 Good 2 Goods 3 Goods
Frequency of price changes 15.22% 18.05% 19.72%
Absolute size of price changes 5.21% 4.29% 3.96%
Size of positive price changes 5.34% 4.46% 4.23%
Size of negative price changes -5.02% -4.04% -3.57%
Fraction of positive price changes 61.68% 61.28% 59.38%
Fraction of small price changes 1.33% 20.97% 23.59%
Kurtosis 1.38 1.76 1.97
First Percentile -6.84% -7.60% -8.06%
99th Percentile 7.09% 8.07% 8.63%
Synchronization measures:
Fraction, Upwards Adjustments - 30.25 38.11
Fraction, Downwards Adjustments - 29.39 37.19
Correlation coecient - 0 0
Menu costs 0.35% 0.65% 0.75%
We perform stochastic simulation of our model in the 1-good, 2-good and 3-good
cases and record price adjustment decisions in each case. Then, we calculate
statistics for each case as described in the text. In the 2-good and the 3-good
cases, we report the mean of the good-specic statistics. We obtain the synchro-
nization measure from a multinomial logit regression analogous to the empirical
multinomial logit regression. We control for in
ation. Menu costs are given as a
percentage of steady state revenues.







































Number of goods 
Mean Frequency of Price Changes with 95% Bands 
Figure 1: Mean Frequency of Price Changes with 95% Bands
Based on the PPI data we group rms by the number of goods they produce. We compute the mean frequency of
price changes in these groups in the following way. First, we compute the frequency of price change at the good
level. Then, we compute the median frequency of price changes across goods at the rm level. Finally, we report












































Number of goods 
Median Frequency of Price Changes 
Figure 2: Median Frequency of Price Changes
Based on the PPI data we group rms by the number of goods they produce. We compute the median frequency
of price changes in these groups in the following way. First, we compute the frequency of price change at the good
level. Then, we compute the median frequency of price changes across goods at the rm level. Finally, we report
the median across rms in a given group.
36Figure 3: Mean Fraction of Positive Price Changes with 95% Bands
Based on the PPI data we group rms by the number of goods they produce. We compute the mean fraction
of positive price changes in these groups in the following way. First, we compute the number of strictly positive
good level price changes over all zero and non-zero price changes for a given rm. Then, we report the mean








































Number of goods 
Mean Absolute Size of Price Changes with 95% Bands 
Figure 4: Mean Absolute Size of Price Changes with 95% Bands
Based on the PPI data we group rms by the number of goods they produce. We compute the mean absolute size
of price changes in these groups in the following way. First, we compute the percentage change to last observed
price at the good level. Then, we compute the median size of price changes across goods at the rm level. Then,
we report the mean across rms in a given group.
38Figure 5: Mean Size of Positive and Negative Price Changes with 95% Bands
Based on the PPI data we group rms by the number of goods they produce. We compute the mean size of
positive price changes in these groups in the following way. First, we compute the percentage change to last
observed price at the good level. Then, we compute the median size of price changes across goods at the rm









































Number of goods 
Mean Fraction of Small Price Changes with 95% Bands 
Figure 6: Mean Fraction of Small Price Changes with 95% Bands
Based on the PPI data we group rms by the number of goods they produce. We compute the mean fraction of
small price changes in these groups in the following way. First, we compute the fraction of price changes that are
smaller than 0.5 times the mean absolute percentage size of price changes across all goods in a rm. Then, we





































Number of goods 
Mean Kurtosis of Price Changes with 95% Bands 
Figure 7: Mean Kurtosis of Price Changes with 95% Bands
Based on the PPI data we group rms by the number of goods they produce. We compute the mean kurtosis of
price changes in these groups in the following way. First, we compute the kurtosis of price changes at the rm
level, dened as the ratio of the fourth moment about the mean and the variance squared of percentage price
changes. Then, we report the mean across rms in a given group.
41Figure 8: Mean First and 99th Percentile of Price Changes with 95% Bands
Based on the PPI data we group rms by the number of goods they produce. We compute the mean size of
positive price changes in these groups in the following way. First, we compute the percentage change to last
observed price at the good level. Then, we compute the median size of price changes across goods at the rm
level. Then, we report the mean across rms in a given group.










































































Number of goods 
Mean Frequency and Absolute Size of Price Changes and 
Number of Goods 
Frequency of Price Changes 
Absolute size of price changes 
Figure 9: Mean Frequency, Absolute Size of Price Changes and Number of Goods
We simulate our model for 1, 2, and 3 goods and compute the frequency and size of
price changes exactly as in the computations for Figure 1.
43Figure 10: Mean Size of Positive and Negative Price Changes and Number of Goods
We simulate our model for 1, 2, and 3 goods and compute the size of positive and
negative price changes exactly as in the computations for Figure 5.
44Figure 11: First and 99th Percentile of Price Changes and Number of Goods
We simulate our model for 1, 2, and 3 goods and compute the rst and 99th percentiles








































Number of goods 
Fraction of Small Price Changes and Number of Goods 
Figure 12: Fraction of Small Price Changes and Number of Goods
We simulate our model for 1, 2, and 3 goods and compute the fraction of small price



















Number of goods 
Kurtosis of Price Changes and Number of Goods 
Figure 13: Kurtosis of Price Changes and Number of Goods
We simulate our model for 1, 2, and 3 goods and compute the kurtosis of price changes









































Number of Goods 
Strength of Synchronization and Number of Goods 
Upwards Synchronization Coefficient 
Downwards Synchronization Coefficient 
Figure 14: Strength of Synchronization and Number of Goods
We simulate our model for 2 and 3 goods and use the simulated data to estimate the
following equation, with no price changes as the base category: fpt 6= 0g 1;0;+1 =
0 +1ft +2t +t where ft is the fraction of same-signed adjustment decisions at
time t within the rm and t is the in
ation rate at time t.
47APPENDIX 1
This appendix contains empirical robustness results to which we make reference in the text.
Table 9: Distribution of Firms across Sectors and Bins
Sector Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Total
11 58.1% 30.95% 5.24% 5.71% 100%
1.36% 0.5% 0.32% 0.58% 0.77%
21 74.48% 19.84% 3.6% 2.09% 100%
7.17% 1.32% 0.91% 0.87% 3.15%
22 19.11% 9.95% 10.73% 60.21% 100%
0.82% 0.29% 1.21% 11.16% 1.4%
23 48.25% 51.75% 0% 0% 100%
3.08% 2.29% 0% 0% 2.09%
31 28.01% 49.92% 15.05% 7.02% 100%
12% 14.79% 16.96% 13.05% 14.02%
32 34.17% 47.73% 13.33% 4.77% 100%
18.82% 18.17% 19.31% 11.4% 18.01%
33 28.72% 52.85% 13.32% 5.11% 100%
28.76% 36.59% 35.1% 22.22% 32.76%
42 27.23% 61.95% 7.33% 3.49% 100%
1.74% 2.74% 1.23% 0.97% 2.09%
44 35.28% 47.18% 7.93% 9.6% 100%
3.78% 3.49% 2.23% 4.46% 3.5%
45 28.12% 50.94% 7.5% 13.44% 100%
1.01% 1.26% 0.71% 2.09% 1.17%
48 36.74% 48.17% 6.55% 8.54% 100%
2.69% 2.44% 1.26% 2.72% 2.4%
49 45.03% 38.6% 8.19% 8.19% 100%
0.86% 0.51% 0.41% 0.68% 0.63%
51 30.79% 48.31% 8.85% 12.05% 100%
3.65% 3.96% 2.76% 6.21% 3.88%
52 28.07% 31.65% 20.45% 19.83% 100%
4.03% 3.14% 7.73% 12.37% 4.7%
53 59.56% 33.81% 2.37% 4.27% 100%
4.21% 1.65% 0.44% 1.31% 2.31%
54 37.34% 53.32% 8.51% 0.83% 100%
2.01% 1.99% 1.21% 0.19% 1.76%
56 29.81% 35.82% 29.09% 5.29% 100%
1.39% 1.15% 3.56% 1.07% 1.52%
62 21.06% 38.89% 17.44% 22.61% 100%
1.82% 2.33% 3.97% 8.49% 2.83%
71 26.87% 62.69% 10.45% 0% 100%
Continued on next page
48Table 9 { continued from previous page
Sector Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Total
0.2% 0.32% 0.21% 0% 0.24%
72 25% 65.87% 7.69% 1.44% 100%
0.58% 1.06% 0.47% 0.15% 0.76%
Total 32.71% 47.32% 12.44% 7.53% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
The table shows the percentage of rms in the PPI that belong to a bin in a given
two-digit NAICS category (each rst line per industry) and the percentage in an
industry given a bin (each second line). Bin 1 groups rms with 1 to 3 goods, bin 2
rms with 3 to 5 goods, bin 3 rms with 5 to 7 goods and bin 4 rms with more than
7 goods
Table 10: Distribution of Firms across Sectors and Bins
Sector Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Total
111 72.73% 19.32% 3.41% 4.55% 100%
0.72% 0.13% 0.09% 0.19% 0.32%
112 30% 35% 15% 20% 100%
0.07% 0.05% 0.09% 0.19% 0.07%
113 50% 45.45% 4.55% 0% 100%
0.49% 0.31% 0.12% 0% 0.32%
114 57.14% 7.14% 7.14% 28.57% 100%
0.09% 0.01% 0.03% 0.19% 0.05%
211 25.3% 45.78% 15.66% 13.25% 100%
0.23% 0.29% 0.38% 0.53% 0.3%
212 81.33% 15.59% 2.16% 0.93% 100%
5.89% 0.78% 0.41% 0.29% 2.37%
213 71.76% 24.43% 3.05% 0.76% 100%
1.05% 0.25% 0.12% 0.05% 0.48%
221 19.11% 9.95% 10.73% 60.21% 100%
0.82% 0.29% 1.21% 11.16% 1.4%
236 48.25% 51.75% 0% 0% 100%
3.08% 2.29% 0% 0% 2.09%
311 24.47% 46.58% 18.93% 10.02% 100%
5.43% 7.15% 11.05% 9.66% 7.26%
312 31.62% 38.14% 21.65% 8.59% 100%
1.03% 0.86% 1.85% 1.21% 1.06%
313 27.15% 62.37% 8.06% 2.42% 100%
1.13% 1.79% 0.88% 0.44% 1.36%
314 25.53% 65.77% 5.71% 3% 100%
0.95% 1.69% 0.56% 0.49% 1.22%
315 34.63% 52.03% 9.92% 3.41% 100%
Continued on next page
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Sector Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Total
2.38% 2.47% 1.79% 1.02% 2.25%
316 40.93% 45.15% 11.81% 2.11% 100%
1.08% 0.83% 0.82% 0.24% 0.87%
321 36.64% 53.75% 7.21% 2.4% 100%
2.73% 2.77% 1.41% 0.78% 2.43%
322 29.45% 57.45% 10% 3.09% 100%
1.81% 2.44% 1.62% 0.82% 2.01%
323 24.08% 47.35% 27.55% 1.02% 100%
1.32% 1.79% 3.97% 0.24% 1.79%
324 63.48% 30% 0.87% 5.65% 100%
1.63% 0.53% 0.06% 0.63% 0.84%
325 29.09% 41.82% 20.78% 8.31% 100%
3.75% 3.73% 7.05% 4.66% 4.22%
326 24.11% 54.1% 11.75% 10.05% 100%
1.74% 2.7% 2.23% 3.15% 2.37%
327 43.87% 45.71% 8.49% 1.93% 100%
5.83% 4.2% 2.97% 1.12% 4.35%
331 35.74% 46.55% 13.79% 3.92% 100%
3.77% 3.39% 3.82% 1.8% 3.45%
332 32.08% 54.82% 9.69% 3.4% 100%
6.21% 7.34% 4.94% 2.86% 6.33%
333 24.21% 52.86% 17.26% 5.67% 100%
5.25% 7.93% 9.85% 5.34% 7.1%
334 29.14% 52.04% 12.88% 5.93% 100%
3.18% 3.93% 3.7% 2.81% 3.58%
335 27.93% 50.27% 13.56% 8.24% 100%
2.35% 2.92% 3% 3.01% 2.75%
336 30.99% 51.15% 13.24% 4.61% 100%
3.45% 3.94% 3.88% 2.23% 3.64%
337 21.9% 57.14% 16.82% 4.14% 100%
1.83% 3.31% 3.7% 1.5% 2.74%
339 27.96% 57.08% 8.63% 6.33% 100%
2.72% 3.83% 2.2% 2.67% 3.18%
421 36.97% 54.62% 5.04% 3.36% 100%
0.49% 0.5% 0.18% 0.19% 0.44%
423 24.9% 64.66% 8.03% 2.41% 100%
0.69% 1.24% 0.59% 0.29% 0.91%
424 25.29% 60% 8.82% 5.88% 100%
0.48% 0.79% 0.44% 0.49% 0.62%
425 20% 77.14% 2.86% 0% 100%
0.08% 0.21% 0.03% 0% 0.13%
441 41.24% 41.24% 5.15% 12.37% 100%
0.45% 0.31% 0.15% 0.58% 0.35%
Continued on next page
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Sector Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Total
442 79.07% 19.77% 1.16% 0% 100%
0.76% 0.13% 0.03% 0% 0.31%
443 67.39% 28.26% 3.26% 1.09% 100%
0.69% 0.2% 0.09% 0.05% 0.34%
444 27.03% 67.57% 4.73% 0.68% 100%
0.45% 0.77% 0.21% 0.05% 0.54%
445 13.41% 60.15% 12.64% 13.79% 100%
0.39% 1.21% 0.97% 1.75% 0.95%
446 7.25% 62.32% 5.8% 24.64% 100%
0.06% 0.33% 0.12% 0.82% 0.25%
447 41.67% 45.24% 3.57% 9.52% 100%
0.39% 0.29% 0.09% 0.39% 0.31%
448 43.8% 25.62% 16.53% 14.05% 100%
0.59% 0.24% 0.59% 0.82% 0.44%
451 33.33% 34.85% 7.58% 24.24% 100%
0.25% 0.18% 0.15% 0.78% 0.24%
452 50.7% 22.54% 7.04% 19.72% 100%
0.4% 0.12% 0.15% 0.68% 0.26%
453 14.49% 65.22% 5.8% 14.49% 100%
0.11% 0.35% 0.12% 0.49% 0.25%
454 19.3% 69.3% 8.77% 2.63% 100%
0.25% 0.61% 0.29% 0.15% 0.42%
481 44.44% 20.83% 9.72% 25% 100%
0.36% 0.12% 0.21% 0.87% 0.26%
482 15.15% 21.21% 27.27% 36.36% 100%
0.06% 0.05% 0.26% 0.58% 0.12%
483 47.14% 32.86% 12.86% 7.14% 100%
0.37% 0.18% 0.26% 0.24% 0.26%
484 28.39% 61.44% 3.39% 6.78% 100%
0.75% 1.12% 0.24% 0.78% 0.86%
486 12.77% 82.98% 4.26% 0% 100%
0.07% 0.3% 0.06% 0% 0.17%
488 49.49% 43.94% 4.04% 2.53% 100%
1.1% 0.67% 0.24% 0.24% 0.72%
491 0% 0% 0% 100% 100%
0% 0% 0% 0.05% 0%
492 21.67% 51.67% 5% 21.67% 100%
0.15% 0.24% 0.09% 0.63% 0.22%
493 58.18% 31.82% 10% 0% 100%
0.72% 0.27% 0.32% 0% 0.4%
511 31.49% 55.25% 6.14% 7.13% 100%
1.78% 2.16% 0.91% 1.75% 1.85%
515 30.05% 62.3% 7.65% 0% 100%
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0.61% 0.88% 0.41% 0% 0.67%
517 14.48% 23.53% 20.36% 41.63% 100%
0.36% 0.4% 1.32% 4.46% 0.81%
518 52.94% 44.44% 2.61% 0% 100%
0.91% 0.53% 0.12% 0% 0.56%
522 54.48% 36.94% 6.34% 2.24% 100%
1.63% 0.76% 0.5% 0.29% 0.98%
523 42.86% 43.88% 4.08% 9.18% 100%
0.94% 0.66% 0.24% 0.87% 0.72%
524 15.94% 27.01% 28.95% 28.1% 100%
1.46% 1.72% 7% 11.21% 3%
531 71.55% 25.1% 1.67% 1.67% 100%
3.82% 0.93% 0.24% 0.39% 1.75%
532 22.58% 60.65% 4.52% 12.26% 100%
0.39% 0.73% 0.21% 0.92% 0.57%
541 37.34% 53.32% 8.51% 0.83% 100%
2.01% 1.99% 1.21% 0.19% 1.76%
561 29.8% 34.98% 29.8% 5.42% 100%
1.35% 1.1% 3.56% 1.07% 1.48%
562 30% 70% 0% 0% 100%
0.03% 0.05% 0% 0% 0.04%
621 22.49% 60.55% 8.65% 8.3% 100%
0.73% 1.35% 0.73% 1.16% 1.06%
622 7.21% 11.91% 34.48% 46.39% 100%
0.26% 0.29% 3.23% 7.18% 1.17%
623 45.18% 53.01% 0% 1.81% 100%
0.84% 0.68% 0% 0.15% 0.61%
713 26.87% 62.69% 10.45% 0% 100%
0.2% 0.32% 0.21% 0% 0.24%
721 25% 65.87% 7.69% 1.44% 100%
0.58% 1.06% 0.47% 0.15% 0.76%
Total 32.71% 47.32% 12.44% 7.53% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
The table shows the percentage of rms in the PPI that belong to a bin in a given
three-digit NAICS category (each rst line per industry) and the percentage in an
industry given a bin (each second line). Bin 1 groups rms with 1 to 3 goods, bin 2
rms with 3 to 5 goods, bin 3 rms with 5 to 7 goods and bin 4 rms with more than
7 goods.
52Table 11: Distribution of Firms across Sectors and Bins
Sector Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Total
1111 66.67% 19.05% 9.52% 4.76% 100%
0.16% 0.03% 0.06% 0.05% 0.08%
1112 70.97% 22.58% 0% 6.45% 100%
0.25% 0.05% 0% 0.1% 0.11%
1113 77.42% 16.13% 3.23% 3.23% 100%
0.27% 0.04% 0.03% 0.05% 0.11%
1119 80% 20% 0% 0% 100%
0.04% 0.01% 0% 0% 0.02%
1121 60% 0% 0% 40% 100%
0.03% 0% 0% 0.1% 0.02%
1122 50% 0% 50% 0% 100%
0.01% 0% 0.03% 0% 0.01%
1123 18.18% 54.55% 9.09% 18.18% 100%
0.02% 0.05% 0.03% 0.1% 0.04%
1124 0% 50% 50% 0% 100%
0% 0.01% 0.03% 0% 0.01%
1133 50% 45.45% 4.55% 0% 100%
0.49% 0.31% 0.12% 0% 0.32%
1141 57.14% 7.14% 7.14% 28.57% 100%
0.09% 0.01% 0.03% 0.19% 0.05%
2111 25.3% 45.78% 15.66% 13.25% 100%
0.23% 0.29% 0.38% 0.53% 0.3%
2121 74.19% 21.77% 4.03% 0% 100%
1.03% 0.21% 0.15% 0% 0.45%
2122 93.94% 6.06% 0% 0% 100%
0.35% 0.02% 0% 0% 0.12%
2123 82.28% 14.66% 1.83% 1.22% 100%
4.51% 0.56% 0.26% 0.29% 1.79%
2131 71.76% 24.43% 3.05% 0.76% 100%
1.05% 0.25% 0.12% 0.05% 0.48%
2211 22.56% 12.78% 12.41% 52.26% 100%
0.67% 0.26% 0.97% 6.74% 0.97%
2212 11.21% 3.45% 6.9% 78.45% 100%
0.15% 0.03% 0.24% 4.42% 0.42%
2362 48.25% 51.75% 0% 0% 100%
3.08% 2.29% 0% 0% 2.09%
3111 20.57% 49.28% 16.75% 13.4% 100%
0.48% 0.8% 1.03% 1.36% 0.76%
3112 23.03% 44.94% 19.1% 12.92% 100%
0.46% 0.62% 1% 1.12% 0.65%
3113 45.76% 19.49% 27.97% 6.78% 100%
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0.6% 0.18% 0.97% 0.39% 0.43%
3114 29.15% 46.86% 13.65% 10.33% 100%
0.88% 0.98% 1.09% 1.36% 0.99%
3115 16.12% 38.79% 31.23% 13.85% 100%
0.72% 1.19% 3.64% 2.67% 1.45%
3116 19.72% 55.63% 18.66% 5.99% 100%
0.63% 1.22% 1.56% 0.82% 1.04%
3117 65.71% 20% 10.48% 3.81% 100%
0.77% 0.16% 0.32% 0.19% 0.38%
3118 17.73% 54.09% 14.09% 14.09% 100%
0.44% 0.92% 0.91% 1.5% 0.8%
3119 20.1% 68.63% 8.82% 2.45% 100%
0.46% 1.08% 0.53% 0.24% 0.75%
3121 27.32% 40.49% 22.44% 9.76% 100%
0.63% 0.64% 1.35% 0.97% 0.75%
3122 41.86% 32.56% 19.77% 5.81% 100%
0.4% 0.22% 0.5% 0.24% 0.31%
3131 29.23% 56.92% 10.77% 3.08% 100%
0.21% 0.29% 0.21% 0.1% 0.24%
3132 31.22% 59.92% 6.75% 2.11% 100%
0.83% 1.1% 0.47% 0.24% 0.87%
3133 11.43% 75.71% 10% 2.86% 100%
0.09% 0.41% 0.21% 0.1% 0.26%
3141 23.33% 61.33% 9.33% 6% 100%
0.39% 0.71% 0.41% 0.44% 0.55%
3149 27.32% 69.4% 2.73% 0.55% 100%
0.56% 0.98% 0.15% 0.05% 0.67%
3151 17.7% 53.98% 23.01% 5.31% 100%
0.22% 0.47% 0.76% 0.29% 0.41%
3152 44.3% 45.57% 7.09% 3.04% 100%
1.96% 1.39% 0.82% 0.58% 1.44%
3159 16.82% 73.83% 6.54% 2.8% 100%
0.2% 0.61% 0.21% 0.15% 0.39%
3161 30.88% 57.35% 4.41% 7.35% 100%
0.23% 0.3% 0.09% 0.24% 0.25%
3162 27.78% 44.44% 27.78% 0% 100%
0.17% 0.19% 0.44% 0% 0.2%
3169 53.04% 38.26% 8.7% 0% 100%
0.68% 0.34% 0.29% 0% 0.42%
3211 13.41% 67.07% 13.41% 6.1% 100%
0.25% 0.85% 0.65% 0.49% 0.6%
3212 61.61% 28.91% 6.64% 2.84% 100%
1.45% 0.47% 0.41% 0.29% 0.77%
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3219 31.62% 64.26% 4.12% 0% 100%
1.03% 1.44% 0.35% 0% 1.06%
3221 37.5% 28.12% 25% 9.38% 100%
0.27% 0.14% 0.47% 0.29% 0.23%
3222 28.4% 61.32% 8.02% 2.26% 100%
1.54% 2.3% 1.15% 0.53% 1.78%
3231 24.08% 47.35% 27.55% 1.02% 100%
1.32% 1.79% 3.97% 0.24% 1.79%
3241 63.48% 30% 0.87% 5.65% 100%
1.63% 0.53% 0.06% 0.63% 0.84%
3251 35.05% 45.33% 16.36% 3.27% 100%
0.84% 0.75% 1.03% 0.34% 0.78%
3252 33.08% 34.59% 22.56% 9.77% 100%
0.49% 0.36% 0.88% 0.63% 0.49%
3253 31.4% 53.49% 12.79% 2.33% 100%
0.3% 0.36% 0.32% 0.1% 0.31%
3254 38.12% 25.25% 18.32% 18.32% 100%
0.86% 0.39% 1.09% 1.8% 0.74%
3255 16.37% 51.46% 25.15% 7.02% 100%
0.31% 0.68% 1.26% 0.58% 0.63%
3256 17.9% 31.48% 40.74% 9.88% 100%
0.32% 0.39% 1.94% 0.78% 0.59%
3259 29.95% 55.61% 9.63% 4.81% 100%
0.63% 0.8% 0.53% 0.44% 0.68%
3261 27.2% 60.2% 7.05% 5.54% 100%
1.21% 1.85% 0.82% 1.07% 1.45%
3262 19.2% 44.4% 19.2% 17.2% 100%
0.54% 0.86% 1.41% 2.09% 0.91%
3271 29.59% 57.53% 10.41% 2.47% 100%
1.21% 1.62% 1.12% 0.44% 1.33%
3272 34.36% 52.86% 10.13% 2.64% 100%
0.87% 0.93% 0.68% 0.29% 0.83%
3273 56.84% 37% 4.83% 1.34% 100%
2.37% 1.07% 0.53% 0.24% 1.36%
3274 38% 50% 12% 0% 100%
0.21% 0.19% 0.18% 0% 0.18%
3279 60% 29.14% 9.14% 1.71% 100%
1.17% 0.39% 0.47% 0.15% 0.64%
3311 25.74% 23.76% 36.63% 13.86% 100%
0.29% 0.19% 1.09% 0.68% 0.37%
3312 30.23% 49.42% 18.6% 1.74% 100%
0.58% 0.66% 0.94% 0.15% 0.63%
3313 41.27% 42.06% 9.52% 7.14% 100%
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0.58% 0.41% 0.35% 0.44% 0.46%
3314 49.74% 39.49% 8.21% 2.56% 100%
1.08% 0.59% 0.47% 0.24% 0.71%
3315 31.52% 57.31% 9.46% 1.72% 100%
1.23% 1.55% 0.97% 0.29% 1.28%
3321 50.79% 46.03% 1.59% 1.59% 100%
0.72% 0.45% 0.06% 0.1% 0.46%
3322 23.85% 43.85% 31.54% 0.77% 100%
0.35% 0.44% 1.21% 0.05% 0.48%
3323 34.84% 60.37% 3.19% 1.6% 100%
1.46% 1.75% 0.35% 0.29% 1.37%
3324 30.95% 49.21% 13.49% 6.35% 100%
0.44% 0.48% 0.5% 0.39% 0.46%
3325 25% 47.5% 25% 2.5% 100%
0.22% 0.29% 0.59% 0.1% 0.29%
3326 32.17% 66.09% 1.74% 0% 100%
0.41% 0.59% 0.06% 0% 0.42%
3327 25.95% 70.89% 3.16% 0% 100%
0.46% 0.87% 0.15% 0% 0.58%
3328 36.07% 61.2% 2.73% 0% 100%
0.74% 0.87% 0.15% 0% 0.67%
3329 28.93% 47.38% 14.58% 9.11% 100%
1.42% 1.61% 1.88% 1.94% 1.6%
3331 15.51% 46.12% 22.86% 15.51% 100%
0.42% 0.87% 1.65% 1.84% 0.9%
3332 33.82% 53.06% 11.08% 2.04% 100%
1.3% 1.41% 1.12% 0.34% 1.25%
3333 23.74% 57.55% 15.83% 2.88% 100%
0.37% 0.62% 0.65% 0.19% 0.51%
3334 20.32% 60.43% 18.18% 1.07% 100%
0.42% 0.87% 1% 0.1% 0.68%
3335 29.89% 62.36% 5.54% 2.21% 100%
0.91% 1.31% 0.44% 0.29% 0.99%
3336 22.16% 52.1% 18.56% 7.19% 100%
0.41% 0.67% 0.91% 0.58% 0.61%
3339 21.56% 47.88% 23.6% 6.96% 100%
1.42% 2.18% 4.09% 1.99% 2.15%
3341 42.48% 37.17% 12.39% 7.96% 100%
0.54% 0.32% 0.41% 0.44% 0.41%
3342 22.73% 62.5% 11.36% 3.41% 100%
0.22% 0.42% 0.29% 0.15% 0.32%
3343 35% 55% 10% 0% 100%
0.08% 0.08% 0.06% 0% 0.07%
Continued on next page
56Table 11 { continued from previous page
Sector Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Total
3344 25.86% 52.02% 14.33% 7.79% 100%
0.93% 1.29% 1.35% 1.21% 1.17%
3345 28.35% 53.92% 13.16% 4.56% 100%
1.25% 1.65% 1.53% 0.87% 1.44%
3346 36.59% 51.22% 4.88% 7.32% 100%
0.17% 0.16% 0.06% 0.15% 0.15%
3351 46.28% 40.43% 11.17% 2.13% 100%
0.97% 0.59% 0.62% 0.19% 0.69%
3352 20.55% 45.21% 26.03% 8.22% 100%
0.17% 0.25% 0.56% 0.29% 0.27%
3353 24.37% 56.3% 10.92% 8.4% 100%
0.65% 1.04% 0.76% 0.97% 0.87%
3359 19.76% 53.36% 14.23% 12.65% 100%
0.56% 1.04% 1.06% 1.55% 0.92%
3361 25% 53.12% 9.38% 12.5% 100%
0.09% 0.13% 0.09% 0.19% 0.12%
3362 36.9% 50.8% 10.7% 1.6% 100%
0.77% 0.73% 0.59% 0.15% 0.68%
3363 16.32% 60.14% 17.48% 6.06% 100%
0.78% 1.99% 2.2% 1.26% 1.57%
3364 38.97% 50% 6.62% 4.41% 100%
0.59% 0.53% 0.26% 0.29% 0.5%
3365 24.32% 64.86% 10.81% 0% 100%
0.1% 0.19% 0.12% 0% 0.14%
3366 62.59% 25.9% 7.91% 3.6% 100%
0.97% 0.28% 0.32% 0.24% 0.51%
3369 35.14% 32.43% 27.03% 5.41% 100%
0.15% 0.09% 0.29% 0.1% 0.14%
3371 22.66% 59.05% 15.31% 2.98% 100%
1.27% 2.29% 2.26% 0.73% 1.84%
3372 20% 58.18% 12.12% 9.7% 100%
0.37% 0.74% 0.59% 0.78% 0.6%
3379 20.99% 43.21% 35.8% 0% 100%
0.19% 0.27% 0.85% 0% 0.3%
3391 22.53% 55.97% 11.6% 9.9% 100%
0.74% 1.27% 1% 1.41% 1.07%
3399 30.73% 57.64% 7.12% 4.51% 100%
1.98% 2.56% 1.21% 1.26% 2.11%
4219 36.97% 54.62% 5.04% 3.36% 100%
0.49% 0.5% 0.18% 0.19% 0.44%
4230 24.9% 64.66% 8.03% 2.41% 100%
0.69% 1.24% 0.59% 0.29% 0.91%
4240 25.29% 60% 8.82% 5.88% 100%
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0.48% 0.79% 0.44% 0.49% 0.62%
4251 20% 77.14% 2.86% 0% 100%
0.08% 0.21% 0.03% 0% 0.13%
4411 52.38% 4.76% 14.29% 28.57% 100%
0.12% 0.01% 0.09% 0.29% 0.08%
4412 47.92% 47.92% 0% 4.17% 100%
0.26% 0.18% 0% 0.1% 0.18%
4413 21.43% 57.14% 7.14% 14.29% 100%
0.07% 0.12% 0.06% 0.19% 0.1%
4421 84.75% 13.56% 1.69% 0% 100%
0.56% 0.06% 0.03% 0% 0.22%
4422 66.67% 33.33% 0% 0% 100%
0.2% 0.07% 0% 0% 0.1%
4431 67.39% 28.26% 3.26% 1.09% 100%
0.69% 0.2% 0.09% 0.05% 0.34%
4441 26.89% 68.07% 4.2% 0.84% 100%
0.36% 0.63% 0.15% 0.05% 0.44%
4442 27.59% 65.52% 6.9% 0% 100%
0.09% 0.15% 0.06% 0% 0.11%
4451 4.72% 44.34% 25.47% 25.47% 100%
0.06% 0.36% 0.79% 1.31% 0.39%
4452 21.21% 68.94% 4.55% 5.3% 100%
0.31% 0.7% 0.18% 0.34% 0.48%
4453 8.7% 82.61% 0% 8.7% 100%
0.02% 0.15% 0% 0.1% 0.08%
4461 7.25% 62.32% 5.8% 24.64% 100%
0.06% 0.33% 0.12% 0.82% 0.25%
4471 41.67% 45.24% 3.57% 9.52% 100%
0.39% 0.29% 0.09% 0.39% 0.31%
4481 55.07% 20.29% 18.84% 5.8% 100%
0.42% 0.11% 0.38% 0.19% 0.25%
4482 60% 15% 5% 20% 100%
0.13% 0.02% 0.03% 0.19% 0.07%
4483 9.38% 43.75% 18.75% 28.12% 100%
0.03% 0.11% 0.18% 0.44% 0.12%
4511 12.2% 43.9% 12.2% 31.71% 100%
0.06% 0.14% 0.15% 0.63% 0.15%
4512 68% 20% 0% 12% 100%
0.19% 0.04% 0% 0.15% 0.09%
4521 50% 25% 10% 15% 100%
0.22% 0.08% 0.12% 0.29% 0.15%
4529 51.61% 19.35% 3.23% 25.81% 100%
0.18% 0.05% 0.03% 0.39% 0.11%
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4531 11.11% 88.89% 0% 0% 100%
0.02% 0.12% 0% 0% 0.07%
4532 3.03% 54.55% 12.12% 30.3% 100%
0.01% 0.14% 0.12% 0.49% 0.12%
4539 38.89% 61.11% 0% 0% 100%
0.08% 0.08% 0% 0% 0.07%
4541 13.51% 75.68% 6.76% 4.05% 100%
0.11% 0.43% 0.15% 0.15% 0.27%
4542 16.67% 72.22% 11.11% 0% 100%
0.03% 0.1% 0.06% 0% 0.07%
4543 40.91% 45.45% 13.64% 0% 100%
0.1% 0.08% 0.09% 0% 0.08%
4811 16.28% 25.58% 16.28% 41.86% 100%
0.08% 0.08% 0.21% 0.87% 0.16%
4812 86.21% 13.79% 0% 0% 100%
0.28% 0.03% 0% 0% 0.11%
4821 15.15% 21.21% 27.27% 36.36% 100%
0.06% 0.05% 0.26% 0.58% 0.12%
4831 31.43% 42.86% 11.43% 14.29% 100%
0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.24% 0.13%
4832 62.86% 22.86% 14.29% 0% 100%
0.25% 0.06% 0.15% 0% 0.13%
4841 20.83% 62.5% 5% 11.67% 100%
0.28% 0.58% 0.18% 0.68% 0.44%
4842 36.21% 60.34% 1.72% 1.72% 100%
0.47% 0.54% 0.06% 0.1% 0.42%
4861 28.57% 66.67% 4.76% 0% 100%
0.07% 0.11% 0.03% 0% 0.08%
4869 0% 96.15% 3.85% 0% 100%
0% 0.19% 0.03% 0% 0.1%
4881 53.33% 28.33% 10% 8.33% 100%
0.36% 0.13% 0.18% 0.24% 0.22%
4883 48.15% 50% 1.85% 0% 100%
0.58% 0.42% 0.06% 0% 0.39%
4885 46.67% 53.33% 0% 0% 100%
0.16% 0.12% 0% 0% 0.11%
4911 0% 0% 0% 100% 100%
0% 0% 0% 0.05% 0%
4921 21.21% 33.33% 9.09% 36.36% 100%
0.08% 0.08% 0.09% 0.58% 0.12%
4922 22.22% 74.07% 0% 3.7% 100%
0.07% 0.15% 0% 0.05% 0.1%
4931 58.18% 31.82% 10% 0% 100%
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0.72% 0.27% 0.32% 0% 0.4%
5111 24.01% 60.64% 6.93% 8.42% 100%
1.08% 1.89% 0.82% 1.65% 1.48%
5112 61.39% 33.66% 2.97% 1.98% 100%
0.69% 0.26% 0.09% 0.1% 0.37%
5151 30.06% 62.58% 7.36% 0% 100%
0.55% 0.79% 0.35% 0% 0.6%
5152 30% 60% 10% 0% 100%
0.07% 0.09% 0.06% 0% 0.07%
5171 0% 3.37% 13.48% 83.15% 100%
0% 0.02% 0.35% 3.59% 0.33%
5172 55% 5% 10% 30% 100%
0.12% 0.01% 0.06% 0.29% 0.07%
5175 18.75% 42.86% 27.68% 10.71% 100%
0.23% 0.37% 0.91% 0.58% 0.41%
5181 52.44% 42.68% 4.88% 0% 100%
0.48% 0.27% 0.12% 0% 0.3%
5182 53.52% 46.48% 0% 0% 100%
0.42% 0.25% 0% 0% 0.26%
5221 54.48% 36.94% 6.34% 2.24% 100%
1.63% 0.76% 0.5% 0.29% 0.98%
5231 45.71% 40.95% 4.76% 8.57% 100%
0.54% 0.33% 0.15% 0.44% 0.38%
5239 39.56% 47.25% 3.3% 9.89% 100%
0.4% 0.33% 0.09% 0.44% 0.33%
5241 13.77% 21.81% 31.56% 32.86% 100%
1.07% 1.17% 6.47% 11.11% 2.55%
5242 28% 56% 14.4% 1.6% 100%
0.39% 0.54% 0.53% 0.1% 0.46%
5311 94.6% 5.04% 0% 0.36% 100%
2.94% 0.11% 0% 0.05% 1.02%
5312 38.24% 51.96% 5.88% 3.92% 100%
0.44% 0.41% 0.18% 0.19% 0.37%
5313 40.82% 54.08% 2.04% 3.06% 100%
0.45% 0.41% 0.06% 0.15% 0.36%
5321 28.95% 43.42% 2.63% 25% 100%
0.25% 0.25% 0.06% 0.92% 0.28%
5324 16.46% 77.22% 6.33% 0% 100%
0.15% 0.47% 0.15% 0% 0.29%
5411 28.43% 59.31% 10.29% 1.96% 100%
0.65% 0.93% 0.62% 0.19% 0.75%
5412 48.67% 46.02% 5.31% 0% 100%
0.61% 0.4% 0.18% 0% 0.41%
Continued on next page
60Table 11 { continued from previous page
Sector Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Total
5413 52.63% 33.33% 14.04% 0% 100%
0.34% 0.15% 0.24% 0% 0.21%
5416 33.87% 61.29% 4.84% 0% 100%
0.23% 0.29% 0.09% 0% 0.23%
5418 34.78% 58.7% 6.52% 0% 100%
0.18% 0.21% 0.09% 0% 0.17%
5613 23.38% 44.81% 24.68% 7.14% 100%
0.4% 0.53% 1.12% 0.53% 0.56%
5615 24.07% 25.93% 48.15% 1.85% 100%
0.15% 0.11% 0.76% 0.05% 0.2%
5616 35.53% 18.42% 42.11% 3.95% 100%
0.3% 0.11% 0.94% 0.15% 0.28%
5617 36.89% 36.89% 20.49% 5.74% 100%
0.5% 0.35% 0.73% 0.34% 0.45%
5621 30% 70% 0% 0% 100%
0.03% 0.05% 0% 0% 0.04%
6211 20.13% 54.55% 13.64% 11.69% 100%
0.35% 0.65% 0.62% 0.87% 0.56%
6216 25.19% 67.41% 2.96% 4.44% 100%
0.38% 0.7% 0.12% 0.29% 0.49%
6221 7.38% 11.07% 27.31% 54.24% 100%
0.22% 0.23% 2.18% 7.13% 0.99%
6222 7.32% 19.51% 73.17% 0% 100%
0.03% 0.06% 0.88% 0% 0.15%
6223 0% 0% 85.71% 14.29% 100%
0% 0% 0.18% 0.05% 0.03%
6231 43.31% 54.78% 0% 1.91% 100%
0.76% 0.66% 0% 0.15% 0.57%
6232 77.78% 22.22% 0% 0% 100%
0.08% 0.02% 0% 0% 0.03%
7131 0% 88.89% 11.11% 0% 100%
0% 0.06% 0.03% 0% 0.03%
7139 31.03% 58.62% 10.34% 0% 100%
0.2% 0.26% 0.18% 0% 0.21%
7211 25% 65.87% 7.69% 1.44% 100%
0.58% 1.06% 0.47% 0.15% 0.76%
Total 32.71% 47.32% 12.44% 7.53% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
The table shows the percentage of rms in the PPI that belong to a bin in a given
four-digit NAICS category (each rst line per industry) and the percentage in an
industry given a bin (each second line). Bin 1 groups rms with 1 to 3 goods, bin 2
rms with 3 to 5 goods, bin 3 rms with 5 to 7 goods and bin 4 rms with more than
7 goods.







We estimate the following specication: fj;p =
0;p + 1;pnj;p + j;p, where fj;p denotes the fre-
quency of rm j in a six-digit product category
p and nj;p the number of goods of that rm. We
estimate the specication at each date, take the
median of 1;p across all products at that date and
report the mean, median and quartiles of median
1;p over time.







We estimate the following specication: jpjj;p =
0;p + 1;pnj;p + j;p, where jpjj;p denotes the
mean absolute size of price changes of rm j in a
six-digit product category p and nj;p the number
of goods of that rm. We estimate the speci-
cation at each date, take the mean of 1;p across
all products at that date and report the mean,
median and quartiles of median 1;p over time.
62Table 14: Fraction of Small Price Changes According to Dierent Denitions
Number
of Goods jdpj < 1
2jdpj jdpj < 1
3jdpj jdpj < 1
4jdpj jdpj < 1
10jdpj jdpj < 1% jdpj < 0:5% jdpj < 0:25%
1-3 39.46% 31.70% 27.28% 17.95% 32.74% 25.78% 20.19%
(0.32%) (0.32%) (0.31%) (0.29%) (0.39%) (0.37%) (0.34%)
3-5 44.61% 36.52% 31.74% 21.53% 35.98% 28.81% 22.86%
(0.31%) (0.32%) (0.32%) (0.31%) (0.4%) (0.38%) (0.36%)
5-7 47.45% 39.20% 34.80% 23.69% 37.53% 30.15% 23.75%
(0.54%) (0.58%) (0.59%) (0.58%) (0.73%) (0.71%) (0.66%)
> 7 50.22% 42.41% 37.56% 26.41% 40.97% 33.40% 26.77%
(0.61%) (0.69%) (0.73%) (0.76%) (0.94%) (0.94%) (0.89%)
Pooled 42.93% 34.98% 30.40% 20.44% 34.98% 27.86% 21.98%
(0.2%) (0.2%) (0.2%) (0.19%) (0.25%) (0.24%) (0.23%)
The fraction of small price changes is computed in the following way: First, we compute a cut-o that denes a small price change.
This is either a fraction of the mean absolute size of price changes jdpj for a given rm, as indicated in the columns, or an absolute
percentage number. Second, we compute the fraction of absolute price changes falling below the cut-o. Third, we summarize
means across rms within each bin.
Table 15: Fraction of Small Price Changes, Dened Relative to Industry
Fraction Small, Relative Measure Aggregated at
Four Digits Six Digits Eight Digits
4d 6d 8d
1-3 Goods 65.90% 65.46% 64.96%
(0.0038%) (0.0038%) (0.0038%)
3-5 Goods 69.46% 69.18% 68.80%
(0.0038%) (0.0037%) (0.0037%)
5-7 Goods 70.50% 70.15% 70.20%
(0.0067%) (0.0066%) (0.0065%)
> 7 Goods 72.41% 72.23% 72.00%
(0.0075%) (0.0073%) (0.0073%)
The fraction of small price changes is computed in the following way: First, we compute
the fraction of absolute log price changes in a given rm smaller than the mean absolute
size of log price changes in a given 4-digit, 6-digit, or 8-digit industry. Second, we take
means across rms in a given bin.
63Table 16: Fraction of Small Price Changes According to Dierent Denitions, Item-Level Based
Number
of Goods jdpj < 1
2jdpj jdpj < 1
3jdpj jdpj < 1
4jdpj jdpj < 1
10jdpj jdpj < 1% jdpj < 0:5% jdpj < 0:25%
1-3 32.18% 25.43% 21.79% 14.15% 31.00% 23.91% 18.78%
0.30% 0.28% 0.27% 0.24% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29%
3-5 31.34% 25.22% 21.88% 14.51% 34.68% 27.46% 21.55%
0.24% 0.23% 0.22% 0.20% 0.31% 0.31% 0.31%
5-7 35.97% 29.74% 26.23% 17.88% 40.51% 33.25% 26.45%
0.47% 0.46% 0.45% 0.43% 0.58% 0.58% 0.58%
> 7 43.83% 37.53% 33.73% 24.77% 47.13% 40.43% 33.64%
0.57% 0.59% 0.60% 0.61% 0.76% 0.76% 0.76%
Pooled 33.19% 26.84% 23.35% 15.64% 35.25% 28.11% 22.26%
0.17% 0.16% 0.16% 0.14% 0.22% 0.21% 0.20%
The fraction of small price changes is computed in the following way: First, we compute a cut-o that denes a small price change.
This is either a fraction of the mean absolute size of price changes jdpj for a given good, as indicated in the columns, or an absolute
percentage number. Second, we compute the fraction of absolute price changes of the good that fall below the cut-o. Third, we
take medians across goods within a rm. Finally, we take means across rms within each bin.
Table 17: Variation Explained by Fixed-Eects
Products at four-digit level Products at six-digit level Products at eight-digit level
R2 3.20% 10.39% 26.95% 3.20% 13.56% 27.64% 3.20% 15.68% 28.54%
Adjusted R2 3.20% 10.39% 25.31% 3.20% 13.47% 25.80% 3.20% 15.48% 26.41%
Month FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FEs No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Firm FEs No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes









i;f;p;t +i;f;p;t where i denotes a good, f a rm, p a product at the 4-, 6-, and 8-digit level,








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































66Table 20: Marginal Eects for Two-Digit Industries,  1/2 Std. Dev., Multinomial Logit
Pooled 1-3 Goods 3-5 Goods 5-7 Goods >7 Goods
Negative Changes
Fraction Industry -0.30% 1.11% 0.68% -0.58% -3.59%
Fraction Firm 9.83% 8.13% 8.02% 11.53% 16.22%
Positive Changes
Fraction Industry 0.01% 0.97% 0.25% -1.10% -3.09%
Fraction Firm 15.84% 13.57% 13.61% 17.79% 25.73%
The table shows the marginal eects in percentage points of a one-standard deviation change in the explanators
around the mean on the probability of adjusting prices upwards or downwards. Marginal eects are calculated for
the model estimated as for Table 18 but for each bin separately and with a fraction of same-signed industry-level
price changes dened at the two-digit level. Estimation, given by the separate columns, is for the pooled data and















































Number of Goods 
Monthly Frequency of Price Changes and Number of Goods, 
Controlling for Firm Size 
Figure 15: Mean Frequency Size of Price Changes and Number of Goods, Controlling for Size
To obtain the frequency value shown, we estimate the following specication: fi = 0employmenti +
P
k kDk;i + i where fi
is the median frequency of price adjustment for a rm i, employment the number of employees of the rm and Dk;i a dummy












































Number of Goods 
Mean Absolute Size of Price Changes and Number of Goods, 
Controlling for Size 
Figure 16: Mean Absolute Size of Price Changes and Number of Goods, Controlling for Size
To obtain the mean absolute size of price change values shown, we estimate the following specication: jpij = 0employmenti+
P
k kDk;i + i where jpij is the median absolute size of price changes for a rm i, employment the number of employees of































































Number of Goods 
Monthly Frequency of Price Changes and Number of Goods, 
Controlling for Industry Characteristics 
With two-digit industry controls 
With three-digit industry controls 
With four-digit industry controls 
Figure 17: Increments in Mean Frequency of Price Changes Controlling for Sector Fixed Eects,
Relative to Baseline




j betajINDj + i where fi
is the median frequency of price changes for a rm i, IND a dummy variable for an industry dened at the 2-, 3-, or 4-digit






















































Number of Goods 
Mean Absolute Size of Price Changes and Number of Goods, 
Relative to Baseline 
With two-digit industry controls 
With three-digit industry controls 
With four-digit industry controls 
Figure 18: Increments in Mean Absolute Size of Price Changes Controlling for Sector Fixed Eects,
Relative to Baseline




j betajINDj + i where
jpij is the median absolute size of price changes for a rm i, IND a dummy variable for an industry dened at the 2-, 3-, or









































Number of Goods 
Monthly Frequency of Price Changes  
Sectors 31, 32 ,33 
Not sectors 31, 32, 33 
Figure 19: Mean Frequency of Price Changes and Sectoral Decomposition
We compute the frequency of price changes in exactly the same way as for Figure 1 but with one change: in the last step of
aggregating rm frequencies, we take means for bin-sector group combinations as shown. The two relevant sector groupings are









































Number of Goods 




Figure 20: Mean Frequency of Price Changes and Manufacturing Sectors 31, 32, 33
We compute the frequency of price changes in exactly the same way as for Figure 1 but with one change: in the last step of
aggregating rm frequencies, we take means for bin-sector combinations as shown. The relevant sectors are the two-digit NAICS








































Number of Goods 
Absolute Size of Price Changes  
Sectors 31, 32 ,33 
Not sectors 31, 32, 33 
Figure 21: Mean Absolute Size of Price Changes and Manufacturing Sectors 31, 32, 33
We compute the absolute size of price changes in exactly the same way as for Figure 4 but with one change: in the last step of
aggregating rm size of price change measures, we take means for bin-sector group combinations as shown. The two relevant





































Number of Goods 




Figure 22: Mean Absolute Size of Price Changes and Manufacturing Sectors 31, 32, 33
We compute the absolute size of price changes in exactly the same way as for Figure 4 but with one change: in the last step of
aggregating rm size of price change measures, we take means for bin-sector combinations as shown. The relevant sectors are
the two-digit NAICS manufacturing sectors 31, 32 and 33.
75APPENDIX 2
Here we describe in detail the computational algorithm used to solve the recursive problem of the
rm. We also present robustness results discussed in the model section.
The state variables of the problem are last period's real prices,
pi;t 1
Pt ; and the current pro-









and A =(A1;t;A2;t;:::;An;t): The value
functions are given by:
V a(A) = max
p
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where V a(A) is the rm's value of adjusting all prices, V n(p 1;A) is the rm's value of not
adjusting prices, 0 denotes the subsequent period, and
V = max (V a;V n):
Our numerical strategy to solve for the value functions consists of two major steps. First, as
described in Miranda and Fackler (2002), we approximate the value functions by projecting them
onto a polynomial space. Second, we compute the coecients of the polynomials that are a solution
to the non-linear system of equations given by the value functions.
In particular, we approximate each value function, V a(A) and V n(p 1;A)); by a set of higher
order Chebychev polynomials and require (A-1) and (A-2) to hold exactly at a set of points given
by the tensor product of a xed set of collocation nodes of the state variables. This implies the
following system of non-linear equations, the so-called collocation equations:
aca = va(ca) (A-3)
nacna = vna(cna) (A-4)
where ca and cna are basis function coecients in the adjustment and non-adjustment cases and a
and na are the collocation matrices. These matrices are given by the value of the basis functions
evaluated at the set of nodes. The right-hand side contains the collocation functions evaluated at
the set of the collocation nodes. Note that this is the same as the value of the right-hand side of
the value functions evaluated at the collocation nodes, but where the value functions are replaced
by their approximations.
We use the same number of collocation nodes as the order of the polynomial approximation.
Therefore, we choose between 7-11 nodes for the productivity state variable and 15-20 nodes for the
real prices. Moreover, we pick the approximation range to be  2.5 times the standard deviation
from the mean of the underlying processes. We use Gaussian quadrature to calculate the expecta-
tions on the right-hand side, with 11-15 points for the real price transitions due to in
ation while
calculating the expectations due to productivity shocks exactly. For the adjustment case, we use a
Nelder-Mead simplex method to nd the maximum with an accuracy of the maximizer of 10 10.
Next, we solve for the unknown basis function coecients ca and cna. We express the collocation
76equations as two xed-point problems:
ca = a 1va(ca) (A-5)
cna = na 1vna(cna) (A-6)
and iteratively update the coecients until the collocation equations are satised exactly.
Our solution method is standard in the relevant literature for example as in Midrigan (2010).
We still conduct two sensitivity analyses. First, given that zero menu costs imply 
ex-pricing,
we verify that the approximate solution is \good" given the known analytical solution. Figure 23
shows that optimal price policies and the price policies obtained by the approximation line up a
45-degree line in this case where we know the exact solution. The norm of the error is of order
10 9 and errors are equi-oscillatory, as is a usual property of approximations based on Chebychev
polynomials. Second, we conduct standard stochastic simulations and nd that the errors between
the left- and right-hand sides of (A-1) and (A-2) at points other than the collocation nodes are on
average of the order of 10 5 or less.
Figure 23: Analytical and Numerical Optimal Flex Price
We compute the numerical solution for optimal adjustment prices given productivity shocks and
zero menu costs. We compare to the analytical solution known in the 
ex price case. Errors are of
the order of 10
 9.
77Table 21: Results of Simulation: Substitution
1 Good 2 Goods 3 Goods
Frequency of price changes 15.22% 21.72% 30.75%
Absolute size of price changes 5.21% 4.31% 3.58%
Size of positive price changes 5.34% 4.45% 3.61%
Size of negative price changes -5.02% -4.11% -3.53%
Fraction of positive price changes 61.68% 59.55% 59.20%
Fraction of small price changes 1.33% 2.86% 1.92%
Kurtosis 1.38 1.53 1.45
First Percentile -6.84% -6.19% -5.58%
99th Percentile 7.09% 6.46% 5.64%
Synchronization measures:
Fraction, Upwards Adjustments - 0.48 10.39
Fraction, Downwards Adjustments - -0.62 10.06
Correlation coecient - 0 0
Menu Cost 0.35% 0.7% 1.05%
Elasticity of substitution 4 6 9
We perform stochastic simulation of our model in the 1-good, 2-good and 3-good
cases and record price adjustment decisions in each case. Then, we calculate statis-
tics for each case as described in the text. In the 2-good and the 3-good cases,
we report the mean of the good-specic statistics. As we increase the number
of goods, we increase the elasticity of substitution . We obtain the synchro-
nization measure from a multinomial logit regression analogous to the empirical
multinomial logit regression. We control for in
ation. Menu costs are given as a
percentage of steady state revenues.
78Table 22: Results of Simulation: Correlation
1 Good 2 Goods 3 Goods
Frequency of price changes 15.22% 17.09% 14.25%
Absolute size of price changes 5.21% 4.52% 4.75%
Size of positive price changes 5.34% 4.61% 4.91%
Size of negative price changes -5.02% -4.36% -4.49%
Fraction of positive price changes 61.68% 62.35% 63.72%
Fraction of small price changes 1.33% 16.77% 18.69%
Kurtosis 1.38 1.77 2.05
First Percentile -6.84% -7.83% -9.38%
99th Percentile 7.09% 8.28% 9.89%
Synchronization measures:
Fraction, Upwards Adjustments - 31.06 38.73
Fraction, Downwards Adjustments - 30.41 37.88
Correlation coecient - 0.6 0.6
Menu Cost 0.35% 0.70% 1.05%
We perform stochastic simulation of our model in the 1-good, 2-good and 3-good
cases and record price adjustment decisions in each case, allowing for correlation of
the productivity shocks Ai;t in the multi-good cases. Then, we calculate statistics
for each case as described in the text. In the 2-good and the 3-good cases, we report
the mean of the good-specic statistics. We obtain the synchronization measure
from a multinomial logit regression analogous to the empirical multinomial logit
regression. We control for in
ation. Menu costs are given as a percentage of steady
state revenues.
79Table 23: Benchmark Case
2 Goods 3 Goods
MP Firm 2 Firms MP Firm 3 Firms
Frequency of price changes 18.05% 15.30% 19.72% 15.30%
Size of absolute price changes 4.29% 5.24% 3.96% 5.23%
Size of positive price changes 4.46% 5.35% 4.23% 5.35%
Size of negative price changes -4.04% -5.08% -3.57% -5.08%
Fraction of positive price changes 61.28% 62.14% 59.38% 62.14%
Fraction of small price changes 20.97% 3.01% 23.59% 3.01%
Kurtosis 1.76 1.55 1.97 1.52
1st Percentile -7.60% -7.47% -8.06% -7.47%
99th Percentile 8.07% 8.02% 8.63% 8.02%
Synchronization measures:
Fraction, Upwards Adjustments 30.25 0.33 38.11 14.46
Fraction, Downwards Adjustments 29.39 -0.63 37.19 13.87
Correlation coecient 0 0 0 0
Menu cost 0.65% 0.35% 0.75% 0.35%
We perform stochastic simulation of our model for the 2-good and 3-good multi-product rms as
in Table 8. Results from these simulations are summarized under the columns \MP Firms." In
addition, we simulate two, and respectively three 1-good rms subject to common in
ationary
shocks but completely independent productivity draws. We record price adjustment decisions
and calculate statistics for each case as described in the text. In the 2-good and the 3-good cases,
we report the mean of the good-specic statistics. We obtain the synchronization measure from a
multinomial logit regression analogous to the empirical multinomial logit regression. We control
for in
ation. Menu costs are given as a percentage of steady state revenues.
80Table 24: Results of Simulation: Menu of Menu Costs
1 Good 2 Goods
Frequency of price changes 15.22% 18.05% 26.98%
Size of absolute price changes 5.21% 4.29% 3.16%
Size of positive price changes 5.34% 4.46% 3.56%
Size of negative price changes -5.02% -4.04% -2.67%
Fraction of positive price changes 61.68% 61.28% 55.34%
Fraction of small price changes 1.33% 20.97% 24.95%
Kurtosis 1.38 1.76 3.95
1st Percentile -6.84% -7.60% -7.87%
99th Percentile 7.09% 8.07% 11.41%
Synchronization measures:
Fraction, Upwards Adjustments - 30.25 -0.20
Fraction, Downwards Adjustments - 29.39 -0.48
Menu costs (K1, K2, K12) (-,-,0.35)% (-,-,0.65)% (0.35,0.35,0.65)%
Correlation coecient - 0 0
We perform stochastic simulation of our model in the 1-good, and 2-good cases, allowing 2-good
rms to adjust 0, 1, or 2 goods simultaneously. The cost of adjusting one good only is K1 or K2,
and joint adjustment costs K12. We record price adjustment decisions and calculate statistics for
each case as described in the text. In the 2-good case, we report the mean of the good-specic
statistics. We obtain the synchronization measure from a multinomial logit regression analogous
to the empirical multinomial logit regression. We control for in
ation. Menu costs are given as a
percentage of steady state revenues.
81Table 25: Results of Simulation: Demand Interactions
1 Good 2 Goods 3 Goods 2 Goods 3 Goods

 =  0:1 
 = 0:1
Frequency of price changes 15.22% 18.76% 19.36% 21.66% 20.76%
Size of absolute price changes 5.21% 4.143% 4.142% 3.90% 3.71%
Size of positive price changes 5.34% 4.34% 4.41% 4.20% 3.93%
Size of negative price changes -5.02% -3.85% -3.77% -3.50% -3.39%
Fraction of positive price changes 61.68% 61.27% 59.14% 58.15% 59.92%
Fraction of small price changes 0.98% 22.05% 24.56% 21.81% 23.61%
Kurtosis 1.38 1.88 2.01 2.03 2.02
1st Percentile -6.84% -7.88% -8.61% -7.84% -7.77%
99th Percentile 7.09% 8.35% 9.10% 8.53% 8.11%
Synchronization measures:
Fraction, Upwards Adjustments - 30.28 38.13 30.04 38.02
Fraction, Downwards Adjustments - 29.45 37.13 29.38 36.98
Correlation coecient - 0 0 0 0
Menu Cost 0.35% 0.65% 0.75% 0.65% 0.75%
We perform stochastic simulation of our model in the 1-good, 2-good and 3-good cases, allowing for in-

















price adjustment decisions in each case. Then, we calculate statistics for each case as described in the
text. In the 2-good and the 3-good cases, we report the mean of the good-specic statistics. We obtain the
synchronization measure from a multinomial logit regression analogous to the empirical multinomial logit
regression. We control for in
ation. Menu costs are given as a percentage of steady state revenues.
82Table 26: Results of Simulation: Demand Shocks
1 Good 2 Goods 3 Goods
Frequency of price changes 15.22% 5.14% 5.52%
Size of absolute price changes 5.21% 4.09% 3.94%
Size of positive price changes 5.34% 4.09% 3.94%
Size of negative price changes -5.02% 0% 0%
Fraction of positive price changes 61.68% 100.00% 100.00%
Fraction of small price changes 1.33% 0.00% 0.00%
Kurtosis 1.38 3.71 3.90
1st Percentile -6.84% 3.73% 3.49%
99th Percentile 7.09% 4.75% 4.71%
Correlation coecient - 0 0
Menu costs 0.35% 0.65% 0.75%
We perform stochastic simulation of our model in the 1-good, 2-good and 3-good
cases, allowing for demand shocks Zi;t instead of productivity shocks. This im-













price adjustment decisions and calculate statistics for each case as described in
the text. In the 2-good and the 3-good cases, we report the mean of the good-
specic statistics. We obtain the synchronization measure from a multinomial
logit regression analogous to the empirical multinomial logit regression. We con-
trol for in
ation. Menu costs are given as a percentage of steady state revenues.
83APPENDIX 3
In this appendix, we describe in further detail the sampling procedure of the BLS which implies
a monotonic relationship between the actual and sampled number of goods produced by multi-
product rms. First, we document that rms with more goods have larger total sales. More goods
will therefore be sampled in total from large rms. Second, we show that sales shift to goods with
lower sales rank in rms with more goods. Therefore, standard survey design implies that not only
more, but dierent goods will be sampled from larger rms. Finally, we also summarize the fraction
of joint price changes in rms.
Sales Values
First, we document that rms with more goods have larger total sales in the data. Because total
sales value determines the sampling probabilities of rms in the sampling selection procedure,31
this implies that on average more goods will therefore be sampled from large rms.
We compute our measure of total sales value for each n-good-type rm in the following way.
First, we compute the total dollar-value sales in a given month, year, and rm by aggregating up
the item dollar-value of sales from the last time the item was re-sampled. Second, we count the
number of goods for each rm in a given month and year. Third, we compute the unweighted and
weighted median total sales value across all rms for a given n-good type of rm and month and
year. Fourth, we calculate the mean and median sales value for an n-good type of rm
We nd that rms with more goods have larger total sales: there is a strong empirical, monotonic
relationship between the number of goods and the natural logarithm of the total sales. Figure 24
summarizes this relationship. Because total sales value determines the sampling probabilities of
rms in the BLS sampling selection procedure, on average a higher number of goods will be collected
from large rms.
Within-Firm Sales Shares
Second, we show that sales shift to goods with lower sales rank in rms with more goods.
Therefore, standard survey design such as sampling proportional to size implies that not only
more, but dierent goods will likely be sampled from larger rms.
We compute within-rm sales shares and sales ranks in the following way. First, we compute the
total dollar-value sales for a given month, year, and rm by aggregating up the dollar-value of sales
of the good from the last time the item was re-sampled. Second, we calculate the good-specic sales
shares for each rm in a given month and year. Third, we rank the goods in each rm according to
these sales shares. Fourth, we count the number of goods for each rm in a given month and year.
Fifth, we compute the mean sales shares for an r-ranked good in an n-good rm in a given month
and year, across all rms. Sixth, we compute the sales-weighted mean for an r-ranked good in
an n-good rm over time. These calculations give us the sales share representative of an r-ranked
good in a rm with n goods.32
We nd that sales shift to goods with lower sales rank in rms with more goods. For example,
the representative sales share of the best-selling good in a two-good rm is 63% while it is 45%
for the second good. For a three-good rm, the sales shares are 45%, 35%, and 30%. Table 27
31Employment is another measure of rm size. The exact same results hold for employment: rms with more goods
have a larger number of employees.
32Note that these shares do not have to sum up to 100% in an n-good rm by way of computation.
84summarizes sales shares by the number of goods and rank of the goods. The table covers rms
with up to 11 goods which account for more than 98% of all prices in the data. Under standard
survey designs such as sampling proportional to size and a xed survey budget not only more, but
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Figure 24: Log Mean Firm Sales Value by Number of Goods
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